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Using wage income tax statistics, we construct continuous series of upper wage income shares in Japan
from 1951 to 2005 to document the evolution of top wage incomes and investigate their long-run determinants.
We find that, while the middle wage income class gained enormously both in absolute and relative
terms during the period of high economic growth, the upper wage income class faired comparatively
better after 1975. In particular, the share of total wage accruing to the top 1% wage earners has risen
steadily in the last ten years. Using a simple time-series regression analysis, we find that marginal
income tax rates, corporate performance, female labor participation, and labor disputes are important
determinants of top wage income shares in post-WWII Japan. Although not conclusive, our results
suggest that much of the recent gains in wage income shares at the top can be explained by the changes
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1. Introduction 
Japan has been known for its solid middle class and relatively egalitarian society for much 
of  the  post-WWII  era.  Recently,  however,  there  is  growing  perception  among  the 
Japanese public that income inequality is rising. Scholars  have  documented a gradual 
increase in inequality since the 1980s using a variety of household survey data. Yet, there 
is much debate over the timing and extent of the recent changes in income inequality, as 
well as its causes and implications for a future course of development (Tachibanaki 2005; 
Ohtake 2005).   
With  respect  to  wage  income,  labor  economists  have  identified  ageing  of  the 
Japanese  workforce,  an  increase  in  non-standard  employment,  and  the  rise  of 
unemployment among the youth as major factors contributing to rising inequality (Ohtake 
2005; Genda 2005). At the same time, some argue that intra-firm pay inequality is also 
increasing as top executives are receiving higher compensation in recent years due to 
changes in corporate governance and payment structure. We know relatively little about 
the upper end of wage distribution, however, due to the lack of adequate data. In this 
paper, using wage income tax statistics, we study the evolution of top wage incomes in 
1951-2005,  evaluate  recent  trends  from  a  historical  and  comparative  perspective,  and 
investigate the determinants of top wage income shares. 
 
2. Data and Methods 
We briefly describe our data and  methodology for estimating top  wage income shares 
(see  Appendix  for  a  complete  description).  Our  wage  income  data  are  compiled  from 
wage  income  tax  statistics  published  annually  in  the  Survey  on  Private  Wages  and 
Salaries  by  the  National  Tax  Administration  since  1951.
1   The  statistics  cover  all 
employees in the private sector who worked for the same employer throughout a calendar 
year, but exclude employees in the public sector, day laborers and temporary  workers 
whose job duration was shorter than a year, and employees who were hired midyear.
2 
Because the survey is based on the data filed by employers of all sizes who are legally 
responsible  for  withholding  income  tax  at  source  for  their  employees,  it  provides 
comprehensive  and  accurate  information  on  private  wages  and  salaries.  In  particular, 
compared  to  household  surveys,  it  offers  more  precise  data  on  the  high  end  of  wage 
                                                 
1  Japan National Tax Administration, Minkan Kyuyo no Jittai, 1951-2005. 
2  Our data thus include part-time workers and workers employed by temporary help firms, provided they 
worked for the same employer throughout a year.   3 
income distribution. Wage income in our definition is the sum of wages, salaries, bonuses, 
overtime pay, allowances, and taxable part of non-cash compensation, but excludes non-
taxable fringe benefits and retirement benefits. As a result, our  wage income  data are 
subject to income shifting where employers manipulate the form of compensation to avoid 
taxation. Because of an extensive and sophisticated withholding system, however, wage 
income  in  Japan  is  subject  to  a  minimum  tax  evasion,  i.e.,  unlawful  underreporting  of 
income (Hayashi 1987; Ishi 2001). 
Top wage income groups (e.g., top 0.1%, 1%, 10% groups) are defined relative to 
the  total  number  of  regular  employees  in  the  private  sector  in  Japan.
3  The  unit  of 
observation  is  thus  individual  and  not  household.  We  estimate  the  total  wage  income 
denominator based on total salaries from National Accounts. Table 1 presents the number 
of wage earners and total wage income for 1951-2005. We estimate the wage income 
numerator (i.e., the amount of wage income accruing to a given top group) from wage 
income  tax  statistics  using  Pareto  interpolations.  Our  estimates  of  top  wage  income 
shares for 1951-2005 are reported in Table 2.   
We also estimate the effective marginal tax rates for various upper wage income 
groups  for  1951-2005.  The  estimates  are  made  for  an  individual  with  a  non-working 
spouse and two dependent children, assuming that all income is employment income. Our 
estimates incorporate both national and local income taxes and take standard exemptions 
into  account,  but  exclude  non-standard  exemptions  and  social  insurance  contributions. 
We summarize  major changes in income tax laws from 1951 to 2005 in Table  3. Our 
estimates of the marginal tax rates series are reported in Table 4. 
 
3. Top Wage Incomes in Japan, 1951-2005 
In preceding work, Moriguchi and Saez (2007) have presented the shares of wage income 
that accrued to the top 1% and 5% population of the wage income earners in Japan from 
1929 to 2005. We briefly summarize the earlier findings to motivate this paper (see Figure 
1). First, the top 5% and 1% wage income shares in Japan were substantially higher in 
pre-WWII years and then declined dramatically in 1935-45 due to tightening labor markets 
during military expansion and far-reaching wartime labor regulations. Second, the shares 
increased rapidly in the 1950s in Japan, temporarily surpassing the U.S. levels during the 
                                                 
3  According to the definition used by the Japanese government, “regular employees (joko)” include not only 
employees on indefinite contracts but also those who have worked for the same employer for more than a 
year under repeated one-year contracts. Therefore, regular employees include full-time as well as part-time 
employees who have stable employment relations.     4 
early 1960s. Third, compared to the U.S. where the top wage income shares show an 
enormous gain since the 1970s, the shares in Japan have been relatively stable, where 
we  find  a  steady  but  modest  increase  in  these  shares  over  the  last  decade.
4  Taking 
advantage of more comprehensive wage income tax statistics starting in 1951, this paper 
improves and expands our previous estimates for top wage income shares and empirically 
investigates the long-run determinants of top wage incomes in post-WWII Japan. 
 
3.1 Top Wage Income Shares and Levels in Japan, 1951-2005 
We  construct  series  of  wage  income  shares  for  various  upper  wage  income  groups, 
starting with the top 40% wage earners and going up to the top 0.01% wage earners.
5 
Table 5-a presents the threshold wage income levels for nine upper wage income groups 
in 2005, the most recent year for which the statistics are available. In 2005, the average 
wage income of regular employees in the private sector in Japan was 4.3 million yen (or 
$39,000). To be part of the top 10% group, one must earn an annual income of at least 
7.8 million yen (or $71,000). The thresholds for the top 1% and 0.1% groups are 15.7 
million  yen  (or  $143,000)  and  39  million  (or  $355,000),  respectively.  Table  5-a  also 
presents  the  number  of  wage  earners  in  each  of  nine  “disjoint”  intermediate  income 
groups and their average wage income in 2005. For example, the average income of the 
bottom half of the top 10% wage income group (denoted by “top 10-5%”) was 8.8 million 
yen ($80,000), and the average income of the bottom half of the top 1% group (denoted 
by “top 1-0.5%”) was 25 million yen ($160,000). The top 0.01% group consists of 4,600 
wage earners with the average income of 130 million yen (or $1.2 million). To provide a 
comparative perspective, Table 5-b presents the threshold and average wage incomes in 
the U.S. in 2004 and Japan in 2005 (all expressed in U.S. dollar). The U.S. estimates are 
from Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2007). Although the average wage incomes in the two 
countries are virtually equal, due to dramatically more dispersed wage distribution in the 
U.S., the threshold wage income for the top  1% group in the U.S. is 1.5 times higher 
compared to Japan, and that for the top 0.1% group is 2.5 times higher. The average 
wage income of the top 0.1% group in the U.S. is in fact 4 times larger than that in Japan. 
To  provide  an  overall  picture  of  the  changes  in  employees’  living  standards  in 
postwar Japan, Figure 2 presents the growth of the average wage incomes (expressed in 
                                                 
4  The growing wage inequality in the U.S. in recent decades has been a subject of many studies, yet its 
causes are still debated. See Lemiex (2007) for a comprehensive survey.    
5  Note, however, that our top 0.01% wage income share series rely heavily on interpolations and are less 
precisely estimated.   5 
real 2002 yen) for top wage income groups over the 1951-2005 period. For all groups, real 
income grew very rapidly from 1951 to 1973 during the period of high economic growth 
and continued to grow at a  modest pace after the 1973  Oil  Crisis until the end of the 
Bubble period in 1990. Except for the top 1% group and above, real income grew little in 
1990-2005. For example, the average wage income for the top 40% group rose 4.3 times 
in  1951-73  and  5.9  times  in  the  entire  period.  Its  compound  annual  growth  rate  was 
impressive  6.8%  in  1951-73  but  declined  markedly  to  1.0%  in  1973-2005,  with  the 
average  growth  rate  of  3.4%  over  the  entire  period.  For  the  top  5%  group,  their  real 
income grew at 6.1% in 1951-73 and 1.1% in 1973-2005, with the average rate of 3.1% 
for the entire period. By comparison, for the top 0.1% group, it grew more slowly at 5.3% 
in 1951-73 but at a higher rate of 2.1% in 1973-2005, resulting in six-fold increase in real 
income  over  the  1951-2003  period.  These  data  indicate  that  the  lower-middle  class  in 
Japan gained more relative to upper-middle and elite class during the high-growth period, 
while  the  upper  class  gained  more  relative  to  the  lower-middle  class  in  more  recent 
decades. 
To examine the evolution of wage income inequality more precisely, we construct 
top wage income shares series. Figure 3-a depicts the changes in the top 40% shares 
from 1951 to 2005. The share of total wage income accruing to the top 40% wage income 
earners  has  increased  substantially  over  the  period  from  51%  to  66%  with  short-term 
fluctuations. Figure 3-b decomposes the top 40% share into the shares of the top 10%, 
next 10% (denoted by “top 20-10%”), and the bottom half of the top 40% groups. It shows 
that the gain in the top 40% share during the first 25 years of the period accrued primarily 
to the bottom half of the top 40% group, while the gain in the last 25 years went mostly to 
the top half of the same group. On average, the top 10% group received 25% of total 
wage income in 1951-2002.   
Figure 3-c decomposes the top 10% wage income shares into the shares of the 
top 1%, next 4% (denoted by “top 5-1%), and the bottom half of the top 10% groups. The 
three  shares  show  similar  time  trends.  The  top  1%  group  received  5%  of  total  wage 
income on average with long-run fluctuations: it peaked in 1961, then declined steadily 
until 1975, and increased modestly since 1997 from 4.6 % to 5.6%.   
We decompose the top 1% wage income shares into the shares of the top 0.1%, 
next 0.4%, and the bottom  half of the top 1%  wage income groups (Figure  3-d),  and 
further decompose the top 0.1% shares into the top 0.01%, next 0.04%, and the bottom 
half of the top 0.1% groups (Figure 3-e). Again the shares of within the top 1% groups   6 
exhibit similar time trends: a sharp increase in the 1950s followed by a sharp decline in 
1961-75, little change in 1975-95, and a marked increase since 1997. On average, the top 
0.1% group received just 1% of total wage income in Japan in 1951-2005. Over the last 
ten years, the top 0.1% share increased by 44% from 0.9% to 1.3%, but it still is less than 
its  historic  peak  reached  in  1962.  While  the  top  0.01%  wage  income  share  shows  a 
sharper rise in recent years, as our estimates on the very top group rely heavily on Pareto 
interpolations especially for recent decades, we have less confidence in this observation. 
In summary, we find that the shares of the top 10% wage income group and above 
rose  initially  in  the  1950s  but  declined  in  the  subsequent  two  decades,  reaching  their 
lowest in the mid 1970s.    Since then, the shares have been relatively stable, but show 
some  sign  of  increase  since  the  late  1990s  particularly  at  the  very  top  wage  income 
groups.   
 
3.2 Evidence from Corporations Financial Statement Statistics, 1960-2005 
The above observations suggest that a faster growth of wage income at the high end of 
the distribution might be another driver of rising inequality in recent years. We hence turn 
to the Corporations Financial Statement Statistics published annually by the Ministry of 
Finance since 1960 to document the trends in  executive compensation.
6  The statistics 
are based on a survey of incorporated companies in all industries except for finance and 
insurance.
7   It  reports  financial  data  of  corporations  by  industry  and  the  size  of 
corporation, including directors’ salaries and bonuses and employees’ salaries. Directors 
are  defined  as  the  board  of  directors  including  corporate  executives  who  are  also 
employees  of  the  company,  while  employees  are  defined  as  non-director  employees. 
Bonus is defined narrowly as bonus that is paid out of net profits at the end of fiscal year, 
and  any  other  compensation  (including  wages,  allowances,  and  bonuses  in  a  broader 
usage  of the term) that is part of labor cost is  classified as salary.
8  By this  definition, 
bonus is exclusively paid to directors. 
In large publicly-traded firms in Japan after WWII, virtually all directors have been 
employees, consisting of a chairman, a CEO, vice-CEOs, senior executives (who typically 
hold  major  departmental  positions  in  the  company),  and  junior  executives,  with  few 
outside  directors  (Kato  1997;  Kubo  2005).  As  such,  one  could  view  directors’ 
                                                 
6  Japan Ministry of Finance, Hojin Kigyo Tokei Chosa Nenpo, 1960-2005. 
7  Because employees in finance and insurance industry receive the highest average wage income among all 
industries in Japan according to the Survey of Private Wages and Salaries, the statistics understate wage 
income inequality. 
8  Bonuses paid out of net profits are not deductible for tax purposes, while labor cost is.   7 
compensation as de facto executive compensation. Since 1997, however, a series of legal 
reforms  reportedly  led  firms  to  increase  a  number  of  outside  directors  albeit  gradually 
(Kubo  2005).  According  to  Abe  (2003),  among  all  listed  Japanese  manufacturing 
companies, the average number of directors per firm declined from 16.3 in 1990 to 11.6 in 
2001, while the number of outside directors per firm declined comparatively less from 3.2 
to  2.6.  Therefore,  the  use  of  directors’  compensation  as  a  proxy  for  executive 
compensation is less valid in recent years, potentially biasing the data. 
Figure 4 presents the ratio of the average director compensation, with and without 
bonus, to the average employee salary by firm size. “Medium” corporations refer to firms 
with capital 10 to 100 million yen, “large” corporations refer to firms with capital 100 million 
to 1 billion yen, and “very large” corporations refer to those with capital over 1 billion yen. 
The average compensation in each category is weighted by employment. Because these 
categories are fixed at nominal value over 45 years, one must note that the composition of 
firms within each category has changed substantially over time. For this reason, Figure 4 
also plots the changes in firm size measured by employment in each category. In fact, the 
average number of employees in “very large” corporations declined from 5,000 in the early 
1960s to 1,200 in the early 2000s. Table 6 reports the average numbers of employees 
and directors per firm by category, as well as the distribution of firms across categories. 
For  the  period  after  1990,  “very  large”  firms  stably  represents  the  top  0.2%  of  all 
corporations  with  roughly  500,000  directors  (or  executives  in  our  interpretation).  As 
positive  correlations  between  firm  size  (measured  by  employment)  and  the  level  of 
executive  compensation  are  well  documented  (Kato  and  Rockel  1992;  Xu  1997),  the 
directors  in  “very  large”  corporations  likely  make  up  large  part  of  our  top  0.1%  wage 
income group in 1990-2005. 
One  of  the  striking  patterns  in  Figure  4  is  a  drastic  compression  of  director-
employee wage disparity from 1960 to 1975 in all firm categories. This, however, is largely 
driven by the declining firm size (measured by employment), as bigger firms exhibit higher 
intra-firm pay differentials. One robust finding is that the ratio of director compensation to 
employee compensation in “very large” corporations has increased sharply from 2.5 times 
in  2000  to  4.8  times  in  2005  despite  the  continuing  decline  in  firm  size  measured  by 
employment (see Figure 4-d). In particular, the percentage of bonus in director’s total pay 
jumped from the average of 11.9% in 1990-2000 to 48.8% in 2005.   
To examine whether the recent increase in director/executive compensation can 
be  explained  by  corporate  performance,  Figure  5  plots  the  compensation  ratio  series   8 
against returns on sales (ROS) series for “large” and “very large” corporations. Although 
ROS has also increased in 2001-5, historically, we observe no strong positive correlations 
between the two series. To see whether or not the recent change is associated with a 
change  in  corporate  governance,  we  also  plot  the  ratio  of  dividends  to  capital.  The 
dividend-capital  ratio  shows  a  similar  increase  (or  much  sharper  increase  for  “large” 
corporations)  in  2001-5,  departing  from  relatively  stable  trends  during  the  previous 
decades. 
There  is  small  but  growing  literature  on  the  determinants  of  executive 
compensation in Japanese firms. In principle, the amount of individual directors’ bonus in 
Japan is set by a CEO based on their rank and performance. Directors’ monthly salaries 
are also determined by a CEO, but in practice, they are said to be often determined as a 
proportion of the highest paid employees’ wages (Kubo 2005, p.430).    Empirically, some 
studies  have  found  a  positive  relationship  between  firm  performance  and  executive  or 
director compensation (Kaplan 1994; Xu 1997; Kato 1997), while others have found no 
such  relationship  in  Japanese  data  (Kato  and  Rockel  1992;  Kubo  2003).  Kubo  (2003) 
finds positive correlations between director’s salaries and employee wages. Interpreting 
weaker correlations between executive pay and firm performance in Japan compared to 
the U.S., Abe et al. (2005) go further to suggest that, executive compensation in Japan is 
designed primarily to motivate employees who will be promoted to directors as a prize, 
rather  than  to  motivate  directors  to  improve  firm  performance.  The  stable  director-
employee compensation ratio among “very large” corporations from 1975 to 2000 despite 
the sizable fluctuations in ROS is largely consistent with the above view. We need further 
research, however, to determine whether the recent change is a temporary phenomena 
explained by short-term economic factors or a break from historical trends driven by a 
structural change in corporate governance or executive labor markets. 
 
4. The Determinants of Top Wage Incomes in Japan 
In this section, we investigate the long-run determinants of top wage income shares using 
time-series regression analyses. We first estimate the effects of income tax on reported 
wage income by exploiting across-time variations in the data. 
 
4.1 Income Tax Policies and Marginal Tax Rates in Japan, 1951-2005 
As  Table  3  documents,  from  1951  to  2005,  the  Japanese  income  tax  system  has 
undergone several major tax reforms. The highest statutory marginal tax rate for national   9 
income tax, for instance, rose from 55% to 75% between 1951 and 1962 and then fell 
from 75% to 35% between 1983 and 1999. Accordingly, effective marginal tax rates for 
wage income earners have changed substantially over the postwar period. Furthermore, 
due to the changes in progressiveness of income tax over time, tax rates have evolved 
differently across wage levels. To assess the impact of government tax policies on wage 
income shares, we first construct annual series of marginal tax rates (MTRs) for various 
upper wage income groups (see Appendix for details). 
We estimate effective marginal tax rates faced by the average individual in each 
wage income group, assuming that an individual has one non-working spouse and two 
dependent  children  and  that  all  incomes  are  wage  income.  The  average  marginal  tax 
rates in each group are weighted by wage income. Our marginal tax rates incorporate 
both  national  and  local  income  taxes,  but  exclude  social  insurance  contributions, 
corporate  taxes,  and  non-income  taxes.  To  obtain  tax  rates  using  tax  schedules,  we 
convert wage income to its taxable amount by adjusting for standard deductions (basic, 
spouse,  dependent,  and  employment  income  deductions)  and  tax  reductions  (e.g., 
proportional tax reductions in 1994-96 and 1999-2005), which are summarized in Table 3. 
To  our knowledge,  we  offer the first precise  and continuous  estimates  of  marginal tax 
rates for a wide range of wage income groups in Japan over the entire postwar period 
(see Table 4).
9 
Figure  6-a  depicts  the  average  marginal  tax  rates  of  national  income  tax  for 
various upper wage income groups. The highest statutory marginal tax rates (denoted by 
“top MTR”) are also reported in the figure. It is important to note that the changes in the 
top  marginal  tax  rates  do  not  necessarily  correlate  with  the  changes  in  the  effective 
marginal  tax  rates  even  for  the  highest  wage  income  group  (i.e.,  top  0.01%).  This  is 
because the effective marginal tax rates are affected also by the changes in deductions as 
well as income brackets. For example, the 1957 tax reform simultaneously increased the 
number of income brackets and tax rates and expanded employment income deductions 
(Table 3). As a result, the effective rates fell sharply across most income groups, while the 
top  statutory  rates  increased.  We  will  come  back  to  this  point  when  we  discuss  an 
instrument for the effective marginal tax rates in our regression analysis.   
Figure 6-b presents total marginal tax rates, the sum of national and local income 
taxes, for various upper  wage income groups. Local income taxes in Japan consist of 
prefectural and municipal inhabitants income taxes. As local income taxes have evolved 
                                                 
9  By comparison, our previous estimates in Moriguchi and Saez (2007) incorporated neither local income 
taxes nor full details of exemptions, and were produced for a few selected top wage income groups.   10 
largely in parallel to national income tax, the overall time trends in the total marginal tax 
rates are similar to the trends in national rates. The levels of the total marginal tax rates 
are 5 to 19 percentage points higher after the inclusion of local taxes. Importantly, due to 
a  progressive  structure  of  local  income  taxes,  their  inclusion  magnifies  across-group 
variations in marginal tax rates. 
Using  Figure  6-b  and  Table  4,  we  briefly  discuss  the  evolution  of  income  tax 
policies  in  postwar  Japan.  From  1951  to  1970,  income  tax  became  increasingly 
progressive as the government raised both the number of brackets from 11 to 19 and top 
marginal tax rates from 55% to 75%. As the economy grew rapidly, marginal income tax 
rates increased during this period for all groups, but higher income groups experienced 
larger  increases.  The  1974  reform,  which  liberalized  employment  income  deduction, 
decreased  the  marginal  tax  rates  only  temporarily.  The  1984  tax  reform  reduced  the 
number of brackets and tax rates for the first time since 1951, followed by the 1987-89 
reforms that quickly brought down the top marginal tax rates to 50% and the number of 
brackets to 5. The reforms in the 1980s, however, affected only the top 0.1% group and 
above. As a result, marginal tax rates for the top 1% group and below continued to rise 
until the 1994 reform that provided a large one-time tax break in the form of proportional 
tax reduction to stimulate the economy. The 1999 reform further reduced tax rates and the 
number of brackets, while instituting a permanent proportional tax reduction. Reflecting 
these policy changes, the difference between the average marginal tax rates of the top 
0.01% group and the top 40% groups has evolved from 32% in 1951, to 42% in 1960, 
61% in 1970, 55% in 1980, 34% in 1990, and 25% in 2005. 
 
4.2 Estimating Tax Elasticity of Wage Income Shares 
Taking advantage of large temporal and across-group variations in the effective marginal 
tax rates (MTRs), we empirically investigate the effect of income tax on wage incomes by 
wage  income  group.  Figure  7  plots  the  top  wage  income  share  series  against  the 
marginal  tax  rate  series  for  top  10%,  1%,  and  0.1%  groups.  We  observe  no  clear 
correlation between the two series for the top 10% group (see Figure 7-a). By contrast, 
the two series are seemingly negatively correlated for the top I% group (see Figure 7-b) 
and for the top 0.1% group (see Figure 7-c). 
We  estimate  the  elasticity  of  wage  income  with  respect  to  the  net-of-tax  rate, 
defined  as  1-MTR,  expressed  in  %.  In  general,  we  expect  lower  net-of-tax  rates  to 
negatively affect reported wage income in the tax statistics through three main channels:   11 
(1)  tax  evasion  or  underreporting  of  wage  income  by  workers,  (2)  income  shifting  by 
employers from taxable to non-taxable form of compensation, such as fringe benefits and 
perquisites,  and  (3)  the  reduction  in  labor  supply  in  response  to  lower  net  returns 
(assuming no income effect). As mentioned, our data are subject to minimum tax evasion 
due to Japan’s sophisticated withholding system, but are subject to income shifting. For 
example,  even  though  all  non-cash  compensation  is  in  principle  taxable  in  Japan,  in 
practice  it  is  not  the  case.  Expense  accounts  for  business  purposes  and  employers’ 
contributions  to  private  pensions  are  fully  exempted,  and  company  housing  is  partially 
exempted. Stock options are typically taxed, not as wage income, but as capital gains at 
the point of exercise.
10  Recreation or entertainment provided exclusively for executives is 
fully taxed, however. Accordingly, we need to interpret our results with caution, particularly 
in terms of their welfare implications.   
There is extensive literature estimating the effects of marginal tax rates on taxable 
income  (e.g.,  Lindsey  1987;  Feldstein  1995;  Slemrod  1996).  In  the  following  empirical 
analysis, we closely follow the methodology described in Saez (2004) and adopt a simple 
time-series regression framework using repeated cross-section data from 1951 to 2005. 
Our dependent variable is log of wage income shares.
11  Because we expect the elasticity 
to  differ  across  different  wage  income  groups,  all  our  regressions  are  run  for  a  single 
wage income group. In the simplest specification, we regress log of wage income share 
on log of  net-of-tax rate (NOTR),  defined by 1-MTR,  and a constant term.  Descriptive 
statistics for these variables are reported in Table  7.  In addition, to control for non-tax 
related  wage  income  growth  (due,  for  example,  to  capital  deepening,  technological 
progress, or human capital accumulation) in each group, we also add linear and quadratic 
time  controls.  In  the  subsequent  section,  we  explicitly  control  for  non-tax  factors  in 
multivariate regressions. Finally, due to the progressive structure of income tax, higher 
nominal wage income leads to higher marginal tax rates (i.e., “bracket creep”), indicating 
reverse causality that may bias our elasticity estimates downward.
12  A standard way to 
counter this problem is to use the top statutory marginal tax rate as an instrument for the 
effective  marginal  tax  rate  under  the  assumption  that  the  former  is  exogenously 
determined by law but correlated with the latter. 
                                                 
10  In Japan, stock options were legalized for the first time in 1997 and not yet widely practiced (Naito and 
Fujiwara 2004). 
11  We use shares, instead of levels, to control for economy-wide nominal and real wage income growth 
documented in Figure 2. Our results are robust to an alternative specification in which we use threshold wage 
income levels (relative to mean wage income levels) instead of wage income shares. 
12  Note that the elasticity is defined with respect to the net-of-tax rate, not marginal tax rate.   12 
Table 8-a presents our regression results for a number of specifications from the 
top 40% group to the top 0.01% group. The first column presents the results from the OLS 
regression in the simplest specification with robust standard errors. As low Durbin-Watson 
statistics  indicate  serial  correlations  in  the  error  terms,  we  report  the  Newey-West 
standard errors in the second column.
13  We add linear and quadratic time controls in the 
third and fourth columns, respectively, to control for group-specific time trends. In the last 
column, we report the results from a 2SLS regression where the marginal tax rates are 
instrumented  by  the  top  statutory  marginal  tax  rates  to  address  the  issue  of  reverse 
causality. 
In almost all specifications, the coefficient, i.e., the elasticity of wage income share 
with respect to the net-of-tax rate, increases monotonically as we move from the top 40% 
to  top  0.1%  wage  income  group.  In  other  words,  as  one  would  expect,  higher  wage 
income earners are more responsive to changes in marginal tax rates either through tax 
planning or labor supply decisions, if not both. This pattern is broken at the top 0.01% 
group, however, and what is more, the elasticity estimates for the top 0.01% group are 
sensitive to the specification as they vary widely from -0.57 to 0.40. We attribute this to the 
fact that the top 0.01% wage income shares are less precisely estimated than the other 
shares,  as  we  rely  heavily  on  Pareto  interpolations  due  to  top  coding  in  the  data. 
Therefore, in the rest of the analysis, we focus primarily on the estimates for the top 0.1% 
group and below. The specification with quadratic time controls performs better for the 
lower wage income groups, largely because, for the top 1% group and above, net-of-tax 
rates and quadratic controls are highly collinear. With the 2SLS regression, the elasticity 
estimate  for  the  top  0.1%  group  increases  substantially  from  0.45  to  1.16,  suggesting 
potentially  large  underestimate  resulting  from  reverse  causality.  The  IV  estimates, 
however, are highly sensitive to specification and are often not statistically significant. This 
is probably because our instrument, top statutory MTR, is not highly correlated with the 
effective MTR below the top 0.01% group as we observed in Figure 6.   
In our most preferred specification, i.e., the regression with linear time controls, the 
elasticity for the top 0.1% group is estimated to be 0.67; that is to say, the decline in the 
marginal tax rate by 1% will increase the wage income share by 0.67%. For the top 1% 
group, our estimate is 0.43, and for the top 10% group, it is 0.20. For the top 40% group, 
the elasticity is effectively zero, which is consistent with the fact that this group faces the 
average  marginal  tax  rate  of  only  20  to  30%.  According  to  these  results,  a  26.6% 
                                                 
13  We also ran regressions including lagged dependent variables and obtained similar results.   13 
reduction in the marginal tax rates (from 65% to 47.7%) for the top 0.1% group from 1995 
to 2000  would have increased their  wage income share  by 17.8% or  0.16 percentage 
point, from 0.89% to 1.05%. The actual top 0.1% share in 2000 was 1.03%. 
Finally, in Table 8-b, we compare our elasticity estimates for Japan with the U.S. 
counterparts obtained by Saez (2004) using the 1960-2000 data and similar methodology. 
The estimates are roughly comparable in magnitude, but the U.S. estimates are larger for 
the top 1% wage income group and above. 
 
4.3 Determinants of Top Wage Income Shares, 1953-2005: Multivariate Analysis 
We introduce additional variables to the regression analysis to study more generally the 
long-run determinants of top wage income shares. First, motivated by our discussion on 
executive compensation,  we include corporate  performance,  measured  by the  average 
returns on sales (ROS) of all corporations. Second, to account for changes in workers’ 
bargaining  power,  we  also include labor  disputes rate (DISP),  defined  by the share  of 
workers involved in labor disputes with dispute acts
14, or alternatively, we use unionization 
rate (UNION), defined by the share of union membership in total employment. We also 
control for the heterogeneity of labor force, measured by female labor participation rate 
(FLP). Finally, we include inflation (INFL) to control for nominal  wage rigidity that may 
differ  across  income  groups.  Table  7  presents  the  definitions  of  the  variables  and 
descriptive statistics. In the regression analysis, we take log of all variables, except for 
INFL (which takes negative values), to provide elasticity estimates.     
In Table  9, we first report the regression results for the top 0.1% wage income 
group in a variety of specifications. In Panel A, the regressions (1)-(4) include no time 
controls, in Panel B, the regressions (5)-(8) include linear time controls, and in Panel C, 
the regressions (9)-(12) include both linear and quadratic time controls. In each panel, we 
progressively add more independent variables. Although not reported in the table, UNION 
was not statistically significant in any specifications.
15  We report Newey-West standard 
errors for all specifications to correct for serial correlations. Comparing Panels A and B, 
we note that linear time trends are statistically significant and tend to improve adjusted R-
square. Moreover, most coefficients are fairly robust to the inclusion of linear time trends. 
By contrast, comparing Panels B and C, we note that the coefficients for NOTR and FLP 
                                                 
14  Dispute acts include lockouts, strikes, and slowdowns. 
15  The lack of union effect on top wage income shares may seem surprising, but it is consistent with empirical 
studies that find little union wage premium in Japan in contrast to the case in the U.S. (Tachibanaki and Noda 
2000; Rebick 2005, p.81).   14 
are sensitive to the inclusion of quadratic time controls, while the coefficients for quadratic 
time  trends  themselves  are  not  significant  and  virtually  zero,  indicating  possible 
multicolinearity between quadratic time trends and the other two variables. We thus select 
the specification with linear time controls.   
Observe that, when we explicitly control for non-tax factors, the elasticity estimate 
for the top 0.1% group drops substantially from 0.67 to 0.28 (see the regressions (5) and 
(7)),  indicating  a  potentially  large  omitted  variable  bias  in  the  estimate  with  only  time 
controls.  According  to  the  results  from  the  regression  (7),  1%  rise  in  net-of-tax  rate, 
corporate  profitability,  and  female  labor  participation  will  increase  the  top  0.1%  wage 
income  share  by  0.28%,  0.27%,  and  0.71%,  respectively,  whereas  1%  rise  in  labor 
disputes will reduce the same share by 0.10%. 
To highlight across-group differences more clearly, in the following analysis, we 
use the wage income shares of eight “disjoint” wage income groups (e.g., top 40-20%, top 
20-10%,  top  10-5%)  as  our  dependent  variables,  instead  of  “nested”  groups  (e.g.,  top 
40%, top 20%, top 10%). In Table 10, we present the results for three specifications with 
linear time trends. We focus on Table 10-b as the most preferred specification, but our 
results are robust to alternative specifications (see Tables 10-a and 10-c). In Table 10-b, 
except for the top 0.01% group whose shares are imprecisely estimated, the coefficients 
for the log of NOTR, ROS, FLP, and DISP change monotonically as we move from the 
lower to higher wage income groups. In particular, for the top 40-20% group, the elasticity 
estimates with respect to the net-of-tax rates are negative and significant, implying that 
wage  earners  in  this  group  increase  their  wage  incomes,  relative  to  other  groups,  in 
response to lower net-of-tax rates. This can be attributed either to possible downward bias 
in our elasticity estimate due to reverse causality, or to income effects that may dominate 
substitution  effects  for  the  lower  income  groups.  Corporate  performance  has  positive 
effects on wage income shares across all groups, but benefits the higher wage income 
groups comparatively more than the lower groups.
16  For example, 1% rise in ROS will 
increase the top 0.1-0.01% share by 0.24%, but for the top 1-0.5% share the increase will 
be 0.17%, and for the top 10-5% group only 0.04%. The same pattern holds for female 
labor participation, where 1% rise in FLP will increase the top 0.1-0.01% share by 0.85%, 
the top 5-1% share by 0.61%, and reduce the top 40-20% share by 0.84%. We attribute 
these  results  to  a  low  share  of  women  in  managerial  positions  and  substantive  and 
persistent female-male pay differentials in Japan (Rebick 2005). For labor disputes with 
                                                 
16  We obtain qualitatively the same results when we use GDP growth rate instead of ROS.   15 
dispute acts, 1% rise in DISP will reduce the top 0.1-0.01% share by 0.08%, but increase 
the top  40-20% share by 0.03%. Therefore, our estimates indicate that labor  militancy 
reduces wage income disparity.
17 
Finally, using the regression coefficients in Table 10-b, we generate fitted values 
and plot them against the actual values of wage income shares for each wage income 
group in Figure 8. Except for the top 0.01% group, the predicted values track the actual 
values fairly well. In particular, for the top 1% wage income group and above, Figures 8-
e,  8-f,  and  8-g show that much of the rise in their shares in the last ten years can be 
accounted for by the changes in the four variables and their historical coefficients. That is, 
the fall in marginal tax rates in the mid 1990s, the improvement in corporate performance 
since 2001, and the downward trends in labor disputes since the 1980s are likely to be 
major driving forces behind the recent increase in wage income inequality, offsetting a 
negative effect of the decline in female labor participation in the 1990s. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we used wage income tax statistics to document the evolution of top wage 
incomes in Japan after WWII. Using a simple time-series regression analysis, we then 
investigated the long-run determinants of wage income shares for various upper  wage 
income groups. Our data indicate that, while the lower middle wage income class gained 
enormously during the period of high economic growth both in absolute and relative terms, 
the  upper  wage  income  class  faired  comparatively  better  since  1975,  and  especially 
during the last decade. The recent increase in the wage income shares for the top 1% 
group and above in Japan, however, is very modest compared to that in the U.S. 
    We  identified  marginal  income  tax  rates,  corporate  performance,  female  labor 
participation,  and  labor  disputes  as  important  determinants  of  the  top  wage  income 
shares. In particular, even after explicitly controlling for socio-economic factors, we found 
that marginal income tax rates have negative and sizable effects on the top 1% wage 
income shares and above. Although it is less than conclusive, our results suggest that 
much of the recent gains in the wage income shares at the top can be explained by the 
above four factors, placing less emphasis on a story of structural change.   
                                                 
17  When we use labor disputes rate defined by labor disputes in general (rather than labor disputes with 
dispute acts), the results are not significant.   16 
Appendix 
 
A1. Wage Income Shares, 1951-2005 
 
The  National  Tax  Administration  has  annually  published  the  statistics  on  wage  income  in  the 
Survey  on  Private  Wages  and  Salaries  since  1951.
18  The  survey  covers  all  employees  in  the 
private  sector,  but  excludes  day  workers,  employees  in  the  public  sector,  and  retirees.  It  also 
excludes employees in those establishments where no employee has withholding income tax to 
pay.  Because  the survey is based on the data filed by employers of all sizes who are  legally 
responsible  for  withholding  tax  at  source  for  their  employees,  it  provides  accurate  and 
comprehensive information on wage income. From this survey, we use the statistics for employees 
in the private sector who worked under the same employer throughout a calendar year, which 
include full-time and part-time workers with job duration longer than a year but exclude temporary 
workers  with  shorter  job  duration  as  well  as  full-time  workers  who  were  hired  midyear.  It  also 
excludes  employees  in  an  establishment  in  which  no  employee  has  an  amount  of  income  tax 
withheld. The statistics include a distribution table that reports the number of wage earners and the 
amount of annual wage income by wage income brackets, which we use to estimate top wage 
income shares.   
 
Our definition of wage income includes wages, salaries, bonuses, overtime pay, allowances, and 
taxable part of fringe benefits, but excludes retirement benefits and non-taxable fringe benefits. It is 
before  subtracting  employee’s  social  insurance  contributions  (for  national  health  and  pension 
plans)  and  before  including  employer’s  social  insurance  contributions.
19  Although  all  non-cash 
compensation is in principle taxable in Japan, expense accounts for business purposes are fully 
exempted, and so is company housing if employees bear at least 50% of its costs based on official 
valuation. Recreation or entertainment provided exclusively for executives is fully taxed, however. 
Stock option, which was legalized in 1997 and liberalized in 2002 in Japan, is in principle not taxed 
as wage income but taxed as capital gains at the point of exercise.
20   
 
We use a standard Pareto Interpolation method to estimate top wage income shares. We define 
top groups relative to the total number of regular employees in the private sector in Japan. Note 
that the definition of “regular employees (joko)” in the government statistics in Japan includes not 
only employees on indefinite contracts but also those employees who have worked for the same 
employer more than a year under repeated fixed contracts.
21  Therefore, regular employees include 
both  full-time  and  part-time  workers  with  stable  employment,  corresponding  closely  to  the 
employees covered by  the wage income  tax statistics discussed above. The series  for regular 
employees are estimated using the Labour Force Survey as follows.
22  We define the number of 
regular  employees    (joko)  in  the  private  sector  as  the  total  number  of  employees  minus  the 
number temporary employees (rinji) minus the number of day labourers (hiyatoi) minus government 
employees (komu). Because the number of temporary employees in 1948-58 and the number of 
government  employees  in  1951-52  are  not  available,  we  use  the  ratio  of  temporary  to  total 
employees  in 1959  and the ratio of government  to regular employees in  1953  to estimate  the 
numbers for missing years. Our estimates are reported in Table  1. As shown in the table, the 
coverage of the survey has rose from about 60% of regular employees in the private sector in the 
1950s to over 90% by the early 1970s. The lower coverage of the survey in the early period is likely 
due to high exemption levels that removed a large number of (presumably small) establishments 
                                                 
18  National Tax Administration, Minkan Kyuuyo Jittai  Chosa (Survey of Private Wages and Salaries). The 
statistics for recent years are available online at: http://www.nta.go.jp/category/toukei/tokei-e.htm. 
19  This information is based on the author’s phone conversation with a Japan Tax Administration officer on 
May 5, 2006. 
20  The definition of wage income and the detailed descriptions of exemptions and special treatments are in 
Section 2 of National Tax Administration (2004), Heisei 16-nen 6-gatsu Gensen Choshu no Aramashi (Outline 
of Withholding Tax), available at: http://www.nta.go.jp/category/pamph/gensen/5151/01.htm.   
21  Rebick (2005), p.58. 
22  The data are available online in Tables 19-7 and 19-8, Historical Statistics of Japan, at 
http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/chouki/19.htm.   17 
from the survey’s sample as they had no employee with income tax withheld. In fact, according to 
our MTR estimates, only the top 20% wage income earners paid positive income tax in 1953-60 
and only the top 40% did so in 1951-71, supporting the above conjecture. 
 
To obtain top wage income shares, we divide the amounts of wages and salaries accruing to top 
wage income groups by 90% of total wages and salaries from National Accounts. The denominator 
is reported in Table 1, under the label, “total wage income.” To be consistent with our definition of 
wage  income,  total  wages  and  salaries  from  National  Accounts  include  employees’  social 
insurance  contributions  but  exclude  employers’  social  insurance  contributions.  In  recent  years, 
where the coverage of the survey is virtually complete for regular employees in the private sector, 
total  wage reported in the survey are approximately 90% of wages and salaries from National 
Accounts. Thus, we use the factor 90% to correct for the exclusion of day laborers, temporary 
workers, and government employees in the wage income survey. We present all values in real 
2002 yen, using CPI. Our estimates for wage income shares for 1951-2005 are reported in Table 
2.   
 
A2. Marginal Tax Rates for Top Wage Income Earners, 1951-2005 
 
To estimate the average marginal tax rates (MTRs), we first estimate MTRs at the threshold wage 
income level  for each wage  income group  for  each  year.  We assume that a  taxpayer at each 
threshold income has only employment income and forms a household with a non-working spouse 
and two dependent children. Our estimates include both national and local income taxes and take 
standard  deductions  into  account,  but  exclude  non-standard  exemptions  (e.g.,  exemptions  for 
housing loans, life insurance premiums, and  medical expenses), social insurance contributions, 
corporate income tax, and non-income taxes. To obtain net taxable income, we subtract basic, 
spouse,  and  two  dependent  exemptions  as  well  as  employment  income  deductions  from  the 
threshold wage income. We then use a statutory tax schedule, which presents increasing marginal 
tax rates by income brackets, to obtain tax liability. Finally, we adjust tax liability to account for tax 
reductions (e.g., proportional tax reductions) to compute MTR for a given taxable income level. 
 
We  estimate  MTRs  at  the  threshold  wage  income  levels  for  national  and  local  income  taxes 
separately, as they employ different tax schedules, exemption rules, and tax reductions. Detailed 
tax codes for national income tax are obtained from Japan National Tax Administration (1988), 
pp.154-207, for years 1951-88; OECD (1988-96), Tax/Benefits Position of Production Workers, for 
years 1986-94; Ishi (2001), pp.344-5, for year 1995; OECD (1997-98), Tax/Benefits Position of 
Employees,  for  years  1996-7;  and  OECD  (1999-2006),  Taxing  Wages,  for  years  1998-2005.
23 
Table 3 summarizes the changes in tax codes from 1951 to 2005. For local income taxes in Japan, 
as part of inhabitant taxes, municipal and prefectural governments introduced progressive income 
taxes on the same income base as the national income tax, since 1950 and 1954, respectively. Tax 
codes for municipal and prefectural  income  taxes are collected  from online publications by the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.
24  Unlike in the U.S. or Canada, Japanese local 
governments in principle adopt uniform “standard tax schedule” set by the national government, 
and hence there is virtually no variation in local tax rates. Total MTRs are simply the sum of the 
MTRs for national income tax and the MTRs for local income taxes. 
 
To estimate the MTR for the average taxpayer in each wage income group, we take the income-
weighted  average  as  follows.  We  denote  highest  statutory  MTR  by  “TopMTR,”  MTR  at  wage 
income threshold for the top 0.01% group by “MTR P99.99,” average MTR for the top 0.01% group 
by “MTR 0.01%,” and the top 0.01% wage income share by “Share 0.01%.” First, we compute the 
MTR for the top 0.01% group as:   
                                                 
23  Supplementary information was obtained by the author from an National Tax Administration officer through 
e-mail dated August 15, 2007.   
24  Japan Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Chihozei no Zeiritsuto no Suii: Dofukenminzei, Kojin 
(The  Changes  in  Local  Tax  Rates:  Prefectural  Inhabitant  Tax),  and  Shichosonminzei,  Kojin  (Municipal 
Inhabitant Tax), downloaded in June 2007 from Section 17, Items 1 and 10 at: 
http://www.soumu.go.jp/czaisei/czaisei_seido/ichiran06_h17.html.   18 
MTR 0.01%= (MTR P99.99 + Top MTR) / 2,   
where a simple average is used as an approximation for this group. We then compute the MTR for 
the top 0.05% group as:   
MTR 0.05%= { Share 0.05-0.01% * (MTR P99.95 + MTR P99.99) / 2 + Share 0.01% * MTR 
0.01% } / Share 0.05%. 
This amounts  to estimating MTR 0.05% as the  average  of  MTR 0.01% and  MTR 0.05-0.01%, 
weighted by income shares, where MTR 0.05-0.01% is computed using a simple average, (MTR 
P99.95 + MTR P99.99) / 2, as an approximation. We then repeat the same procedure to estimate 
the MTRs for the next top wage income groups, using MTR 0.01% and MTR 0.05% estimated 
above. Our estimates for the average MTRs are presented in Table 4. 
 
Our  marginal  tax  rates  do  not  take  into  account  social  insurance  contributions.  Since  their 
introduction  in  the  early  1950s,  social  insurance  contributions  for  public  pensions  and  national 
health insurance in Japan have been determined as a fixed percentage of monthly earnings up to a 
maximum amount of monthly earnings set by law. The cap on monthly earnings has been set at 
around twice the average earnings of all insurers and revised periodically to adjust for inflation.
25 
As a result, including social insurance taxes would hardly affect our estimates for MTRs for top 1% 
wage income group and above, but increase those for the lower wage income groups. 
 
 
                                                 
25  See “Tsuiseki Nenkin Kaikaku (Pension Reform)” published in Yomiuri Shimbun Online on June 4, 2004, at: 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/atmoney/special/43/kaikaku53.htm and Kosei Hakusho (White Paper on Health and 
Welfare) in 1965 available online at: http://wwwhakusyo.mhlw.go.jp/wpdocs/hpaz196501/b0163.html.   19 
REFERENCES 
 
Abe, Naohito, Noel Gaston, and Katsuyuki Kubo. 2005. “Executive Pay in Japan: the Role 
of  Bank-appointed  Monitors  and  the  Main  Bank  Relationship,”  Japan  and  the 
World Economy 17: 371-394. 
Abe,  Naohito.  2003.  “Managerial  Incentive  Mechanisms  and  Turnover  of  Company 
Presidents and Directors in Japan,” unpublished manuscript, Institute of Economic 
Research, Hitotsubashi University.   
Abowd, John and Michael Bognanno. 1995. “International Differences in Executive and 
Managerial Compensation,” in Katz and Freeman, eds, Differences and Changes 
in Wage Structure. Chicago; Chicago University Press.     
— and  Steven  Kaplan. 1999. “Executive Compensation:  Six Questions  That Need  Answering.” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 13(4): 145-68.   
Aktinson, Anthony and Thomas Piketty, eds., 2007. Top Incomes from a Historical and 
International Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Feldstein, Martin. 1995. "The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: A Panel 
Study of the 1986 Tax Reform Act." Journal of Political Economy 103: 551-572. 
Genda, Yuji. 2005. A Nagging Sense of Job Insecurity: The New Reality Facing Japanese 
Youth. Tokyo: International House of Japan. 
Hart,  R.  and  S.  Kawasaki.  1999.  Work  and  Pay  in  Japan.  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hayashi,  Hiroaki.  1987.  “Shotokuzei:  Kinrou  Shotoku  to  Shisan  Shotoku  (Income  Tax: 
Labor  Income  and  Capital  Income),”  in  Hashimoto  and  Yomamoto,  eds., 
Nihongata Zeisei Kaikaku (Japanese-style Tax Reform). Tokyo: Yuhikaku. 
Ishi,  Hiromitsu.  2001.  The  Japanese  Tax  System,  Third  Edition.  New  York:  Oxford 
University Press. 
Japan Statistics Bureau. 1949-2005. Japan Statistical Yearbook, bilingual. 
Japan Ministry of Finance. 1960-2005. Hojin Kigyo Tokei Chosa (Corporations Financial 
Statement Statistics). 
Japan National Tax Administration. 1951-2005. Minkan Kyuyo no Jittai (Survey on Private 
Wages and Salaries).   
—. 1988. Shotokuzei Hyakunenshi (Hundred-Year History of Income Tax). 
Kaplan, S. 1994. “Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan 
and the U.S.” Journal of Political Economy 102: 510-546. 
Kato, Takao. 1997. “Chief Executive Compensation and Corporate Groups in Japan: New 
Evidence  from  Micro  Data.”  International  Journal  of  Industrial  Organization  14: 
455-467. 
—  and Rockel, M. 1992. “Experience, Credentials, and Compensation in the Japanese 
and U.S. Managerial Labor Markets: Evidence from New Micro Data.” Journal of 
the International and Japanese Economies 6: 30-51. 
Kopczuk,  Wojcech,  Emmanuel  Saez,  and  Jae  Song.  2007.  “Uncovering  the  American 
Dream:  Inequality  and  Mobility  in  Social  Security  Earnings  Data  since  1937.” 
NBER Working Paper No.13345. 
Kubo, Katsuyuki. 2003. “Executive Compensation in Japan and the UK” in Joseph Fan et 
al. ed., Designing Financial Systems in East Asia and Japan. London: Routledge 
Curzon. 
—.  2005.  “Executive  Compensation  Policy  and  Company  Performance  in  Japan.” 
Corporate Governance, 429-435.   
Lemieux,  Thomas.  2007.  “The  Changing  Nature  of  Wage  Inequality,”  NBER  Working 
Paper No.13523.   20 
Lindsey, Lawrence. 1987. "Individual Taxpayer Response to Tax Cuts: 1982-1984, with 
Implications for the Revenue Maximizing Tax Rate." Journal of Public Economics 
33: 173-206. 
Moriguchi, Chiaki, and Emmanuel Saez. 2007. “The Evolution of Income Concentration in 
Japan, 1886-2005: Evidence from Income Tax Statistics,” forthcoming in Review of 
Economics and Statistics. 
Morishima,  Motohiro.  1991.  “Information  Sharing  and  Collective  Bargaining  in  Japan: 
Effects on Wage Negotiation.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 44:469-485. 
Naito,  Ryoyu  and  Shoji  Fujiwara.  2004.  Stokku  Opushon  no  Jitsumu  (Practicing  Stock 
Options). Tokyo: Shoji Homu. 
Nishizaki, Fumihira, Yutaka Yamada, and Eisuke Ando. 1998. Nihon no Shotoku Kakusa: 
Kokusai  Hikaku  no  Shiten  kara  (Income  Inequality  in  Japan:  An  International 
Comparison). Tokyo: Keizai Kikakucho Keizai Kenkyusho. 
OECD. 1988-1996. Tax/Benefits Position of Production Workers. Paris: OECD. 
—. 1997-1998. Tax/Benefits Position of Employees. Paris: OECD. 
—. 1999-2006. Taxing Wages. Paris: OECD. 
Ohtake,  Fumio.  2005.    Nihon  no  Fubyodo  (Inequality  in  Japan).  Tokyo:  Nihon  Keizai 
Shinbunsha. 
Piketty,  Thomas  and  Emmanuel  Saez.  2003.  "Income  Inequality  in  the  United  States, 
1913-1998." Quarterly Journal of Economics 118: 1-39. 
Rebick, Marcus. 2005. The Changing Japanese Employment System. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Saez,  Emmanuel.  2004.  "Reported  Incomes  and  Marginal  Tax  Rates,  1960-2000: 
Evidence and Policy Implications." In Tax Policy and the Economy, vol.18, James 
Poterba ed. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Slemrod,  Joel.  1996.  “High  Income  Families  and  the  Tax  Changes  of  the  1980s,”  in 
Empirical  Foundations  for  Household  Taxation,  Feldstein  and  Poterba  eds. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Tachibanaki,  Toshiaki.  2000.  "Nihon  no  Shotoku  Kakusa  ha  Kakudai  shiteiruka?  (Is 
Income Inequality in Japan Rising?)." Nihon Rodo Kenkyu Zasshi 480:41-51. 
Tachibanaki, Toshiaki, and Tomohiko Noda. 2000. The Economic Effects of Trade Unions 
in Japan. London: McMillan Press. 
—. 2005. Confronting Income Inequality in Japan. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Xu, Peng. 1997. “Executive Salaries as Tournament Prizes and Executive Bonuses as 
Managerial  Incentive  in  Japan.”  Journal  of  the  International  and  Japanese 
Economies 11: 319-346. Table 1: Employees, Wage Income, and Inflation in Japan, 1951-2005
Inflation
Total Number of % of 
Number of Employees in Employees in Total Average CPI 
Year Employees the Statistics the Statistics Wage Income Wage Income (2002 base 100)  
('000s) ('000s) (billions 2002 yen) ('000s 2002 yen)
1951 11,835 6,463 54.6 11,104 938 15.19
1952 12,275 6,838 55.7 12,846 1,046 16.03
1953 14,340 6,939 48.4 14,870 1,037 17.08
1954 14,800 7,625 51.5 15,439 1,043 18.12
1955 15,370 8,219 53.5 16,486 1,073 18.02
1956 16,660 8,745 52.5 18,813 1,129 18.12
1957 17,790 9,431 53.0 20,549 1,155 18.65
1958 18,860 10,268 54.4 22,776 1,208 18.54
1959 19,020 10,856 57.1 25,316 1,331 18.75
1960 20,220 11,715 57.9 28,091 1,389 19.49
1961 21,210 12,962 61.1 31,665 1,493 20.43
1962 22,190 14,106 63.6 35,153 1,584 21.90
1963 23,230 15,250 65.6 38,029 1,637 23.47
1964 24,080 16,123 67.0 42,642 1,771 24.41
1965 25,050 17,170 68.5 46,583 1,860 25.98
1966 26,160 18,277 69.9 50,978 1,949 27.34
1967 27,670 19,773 71.5 56,392 2,038 28.39
1968 28,690 20,676 72.1 62,196 2,168 29.96
1969 29,190 22,066 75.6 69,588 2,384 31.53
1970 30,230 24,244 80.2 77,696 2,570 33.94
1971 31,230 26,480 84.8 86,792 2,779 35.93
1972 31,620 27,096 85.7 96,653 3,057 37.61
1973 32,880 28,181 85.7 108,657 3,305 42.01
1974 33,220 29,895 90.0 110,902 3,338 52.28
1975 33,460 30,321 90.6 114,416 3,419 58.46
1976 34,020 31,068 91.3 117,435 3,452 64.01
1977 34,260 31,151 90.9 120,527 3,518 69.14
1978 34,360 32,113 93.5 125,063 3,640 71.66
1979 35,050 32,534 92.8 129,837 3,704 74.28
1980 35,860 33,361 93.0 130,085 3,628 80.25
1981 36,460 33,659 92.3 132,860 3,644 84.12
1982 36,920 33,996 92.1 136,637 3,701 86.43
1983 37,730 34,928 92.6 140,826 3,732 88.00
1984 38,260 35,306 92.3 145,394 3,800 89.99
1985 38,660 36,938 95.5 148,370 3,838 91.77
1986 39,320 37,287 94.8 153,379 3,901 92.19
1987 39,640 37,670 95.0 157,781 3,980 91.98
1988 40,540 37,918 93.5 165,970 4,094 92.40
1989 41,760 38,470 92.1 173,262 4,149 94.60
1990 43,160 39,307 91.1 181,689 4,210 97.53
1991 44,770 40,339 90.1 189,819 4,240 100.68
1992 45,890 41,247 89.9 195,086 4,251 102.35
1993 46,570 42,770 91.8 197,072 4,232 103.51
1994 46,900 43,726 93.2 201,399 4,294 104.03
1995 47,090 44,395 94.3 203,262 4,316 103.71
1996 47,540 44,895 94.4 207,393 4,362 103.71
1997 47,910 45,265 94.5 209,891 4,381 104.65
1998 47,500 45,446 95.7 206,707 4,352 104.54
1999 46,900 44,984 95.9 202,901 4,326 103.82
2000 46,840 44,939 95.9 207,231 4,424 102.47
2001 46,770 45,097 96.4 207,932 4,446 100.91
2002 46,040 44,724 97.1 198,802 4,400 100.00
2003 45,980 44,661 97.1 198,322 4,313 99.70
2004 46,080 44,530 96.6 197,278 4,281 99.70
2005 46,310 44,936 97.0 199,881 4,316 99.39
Notes: See Appendix for details.
The total number of employees is the number of regular employees, which include employees on indefinite contracts and employees 
who have worked for the same employer for more than one year on definite contracts.
The number of employees in the statistics is the number of employees in the private sector who worked for the same employer
throughout a calendar year reported in the Survey of Private Wages and Salaries.
Total wage income is defined as 90% of total wages and salaries from the National Accounts.
Wage Income  Wage Earners Table 2  Top Wage Income Shares in Japan, 1951-2005















1951 51.47 35.86 23.20 14.70 4.83 2.98 0.97 0.60 0.19 15.61 12.67 8.50 9.87 1.85 2.01 0.37 0.41 1951
1952 53.39 37.18 24.37 15.60 5.39 3.37 1.10 0.69 0.22 16.21 12.82 8.77 10.21 2.02 2.27 0.41 0.47 1952
1953 51.17 36.58 24.06 15.46 5.35 3.36 1.12 0.70 0.22 14.59 12.51 8.61 10.11 2.00 2.23 0.42 0.48 1953
1954 51.78 36.90 24.20 15.48 5.34 3.36 1.11 0.70 0.23 14.88 12.70 8.72 10.14 1.98 2.25 0.42 0.47 1954
1955 52.34 36.99 24.19 15.43 5.34 3.34 1.10 0.69 0.22 15.35 12.80 8.77 10.09 2.00 2.24 0.41 0.47 1955
1956 54.60 39.00 25.77 16.67 5.88 3.64 1.24 0.75 0.25 15.60 13.23 9.11 10.79 2.24 2.41 0.48 0.51 1956
1957 56.37 40.52 26.84 17.31 6.10 3.79 1.29 0.79 0.25 15.86 13.68 9.53 11.21 2.31 2.50 0.51 0.53 1957
1958 55.61 39.87 26.47 17.13 6.06 3.80 1.28 0.81 0.26 15.74 13.41 9.34 11.06 2.27 2.51 0.47 0.55 1958
1959 56.05 39.99 26.49 17.18 6.19 4.04 1.32 0.81 0.25 16.06 13.50 9.31 11.00 2.15 2.72 0.51 0.56 1959
1960 56.93 40.52 27.00 17.48 6.14 3.90 1.32 0.83 0.26 16.42 13.52 9.52 11.34 2.24 2.58 0.50 0.56 1960
1961 58.92 41.39 27.41 17.91 6.58 4.23 1.34 0.83 0.26 17.53 13.98 9.50 11.33 2.35 2.89 0.52 0.56 1961
1962 58.56 40.62 26.85 17.70 6.40 4.07 1.29 0.79 0.25 17.94 13.77 9.14 11.31 2.33 2.78 0.50 0.54 1962
1963 59.18 40.51 26.67 17.31 6.20 3.90 1.31 0.82 0.27 18.66 13.84 9.36 11.11 2.31 2.59 0.50 0.55 1963
1964 58.80 39.91 26.17 16.96 6.02 3.74 1.24 0.76 0.24 18.89 13.74 9.21 10.94 2.28 2.50 0.47 0.52 1964
1965 57.43 38.45 25.01 16.12 5.59 3.43 1.13 0.70 0.23 18.98 13.44 8.89 10.53 2.16 2.30 0.43 0.48 1965
1966 56.70 37.85 24.43 15.62 5.37 3.31 1.08 0.65 0.20 18.85 13.42 8.81 10.25 2.06 2.23 0.43 0.45 1966
1967 59.51 39.10 25.08 16.00 5.42 3.37 1.11 0.68 0.22 20.41 14.02 9.08 10.58 2.05 2.26 0.44 0.46 1967
1968 60.60 39.74 25.49 16.24 5.41 3.36 1.11 0.68 0.21 20.86 14.25 9.25 10.83 2.05 2.26 0.43 0.47 1968
1969 60.70 39.75 25.24 15.98 5.18 3.21 1.03 0.63 0.19 20.95 14.52 9.26 10.79 1.97 2.18 0.40 0.44 1969
1970 62.37 40.18 25.50 15.95 5.04 3.10 1.00 0.61 0.19 22.19 14.68 9.55 10.91 1.94 2.10 0.39 0.43 1970
1971 62.53 40.13 25.19 15.63 4.93 2.99 0.94 0.56 0.18 22.40 14.94 9.57 10.70 1.94 2.05 0.37 0.38 1971
1972 62.45 40.04 25.24 15.70 5.02 2.96 0.89 0.53 0.16 22.41 14.81 9.54 10.68 2.06 2.07 0.36 0.37 1972
1973 62.37 39.89 24.91 15.44 4.85 2.81 0.85 0.52 0.16 22.48 14.98 9.47 10.59 2.04 1.96 0.33 0.36 1973
1974 62.48 39.56 24.47 14.97 4.56 2.72 0.81 0.48 0.15 22.92 15.09 9.49 10.41 1.84 1.91 0.33 0.34 1974
1975 60.52 38.17 23.54 14.33 4.33 2.57 0.75 0.45 0.13 22.36 14.63 9.20 10.00 1.76 1.82 0.31 0.32 1975
1976 61.85 38.96 24.01 14.63 4.43 2.61 0.80 0.47 0.13 22.89 14.95 9.38 10.19 1.82 1.82 0.32 0.34 1976
1977 60.23 37.86 23.36 14.11 4.29 2.54 0.74 0.44 0.13 22.37 14.51 9.25 9.82 1.76 1.79 0.30 0.31 1977
1978 60.36 37.85 23.32 14.06 4.32 2.59 0.78 0.46 0.14 22.50 14.53 9.26 9.74 1.73 1.82 0.32 0.32 1978
1979 61.52 38.76 23.92 14.53 4.47 2.69 0.84 0.51 0.16 22.76 14.84 9.40 10.06 1.78 1.86 0.33 0.35 1979
1980 61.69 38.83 23.91 14.51 4.46 2.71 0.88 0.55 0.19 22.86 14.92 9.40 10.05 1.75 1.83 0.33 0.36 1980
1981 61.57 38.87 23.92 14.62 4.50 2.72 0.84 0.51 0.16 22.70 14.95 9.30 10.12 1.79 1.88 0.33 0.35 1981
1982 61.12 38.37 23.47 14.32 4.37 2.64 0.83 0.51 0.17 22.75 14.90 9.15 9.96 1.73 1.81 0.32 0.35 1982
1983 61.99 38.97 23.78 14.57 4.42 2.66 0.82 0.50 0.16 23.02 15.19 9.21 10.15 1.75 1.85 0.32 0.34 1983
1984 61.49 38.88 23.81 14.60 4.46 2.70 0.84 0.52 0.17 22.61 15.07 9.22 10.13 1.76 1.86 0.32 0.35 1984
1985 63.03 39.85 24.30 14.85 4.51 2.73 0.86 0.53 0.17 23.19 15.55 9.45 10.33 1.78 1.87 0.33 0.36 1985
1986 63.66 40.40 24.70 15.08 4.54 2.71 0.84 0.52 0.17 23.26 15.71 9.62 10.54 1.83 1.87 0.32 0.35 1986
1987 64.14 40.54 25.08 15.28 4.68 2.79 0.88 0.54 0.17 23.60 15.46 9.80 10.60 1.89 1.91 0.34 0.37 1987
1988 64.05 40.76 25.15 15.33 4.65 2.75 0.84 0.51 0.16 23.29 15.62 9.82 10.67 1.90 1.91 0.33 0.35 1988
1989 64.30 40.98 25.32 15.43 4.70 2.78 0.88 0.54 0.17 23.33 15.65 9.90 10.73 1.92 1.91 0.34 0.37 1989
1990 64.72 41.33 25.59 15.61 4.78 2.84 0.90 0.55 0.17 23.39 15.74 9.99 10.82 1.94 1.95 0.35 0.37 1990
1991 65.00 41.60 25.78 15.76 4.79 2.87 0.91 0.55 0.18 23.40 15.82 10.01 10.98 1.91 1.97 0.35 0.38 1991
1992 65.13 41.70 25.92 15.85 4.79 2.88 0.92 0.57 0.18 23.44 15.78 10.08 11.05 1.91 1.96 0.36 0.38 1992
1993 64.94 41.48 25.70 15.66 4.72 2.83 0.88 0.53 0.17 23.46 15.78 10.04 10.94 1.90 1.95 0.35 0.37 1993
1994 65.22 41.65 25.74 15.57 4.71 2.84 0.92 0.57 0.18 23.58 15.91 10.18 10.86 1.87 1.92 0.35 0.38 1994
1995 65.37 41.70 25.76 15.54 4.73 2.85 0.89 0.54 0.17 23.67 15.93 10.23 10.80 1.89 1.96 0.35 0.37 1995
1996 65.16 41.43 25.46 15.29 4.64 2.80 0.89 0.55 0.18 23.73 15.97 10.18 10.65 1.84 1.91 0.34 0.37 1996
1997 65.29 41.48 25.42 15.21 4.60 2.78 0.89 0.55 0.18 23.82 16.05 10.22 10.61 1.82 1.89 0.34 0.37 1997
1998 65.62 41.80 25.73 15.54 4.83 2.96 0.94 0.57 0.18 23.82 16.06 10.20 10.71 1.87 2.01 0.37 0.39 1998
1999 65.57 41.90 25.89 15.73 4.89 3.00 1.00 0.62 0.21 23.67 16.00 10.16 10.84 1.89 2.01 0.37 0.41 1999
2000 65.05 41.58 25.74 15.68 4.95 3.07 1.03 0.65 0.22 23.47 15.84 10.06 10.73 1.88 2.04 0.38 0.43 2000
2001 64.94 41.49 25.68 15.66 5.01 3.12 1.06 0.67 0.24 23.46 15.81 10.02 10.65 1.89 2.06 0.39 0.44 2001
2002 66.63 42.50 26.29 16.08 5.15 3.21 1.09 0.68 0.23 24.13 16.21 10.21 10.93 1.94 2.12 0.40 0.45 2002
2003 66.75 42.75 26.56 16.32 5.29 3.34 1.18 0.76 0.27 23.99 16.19 10.24 11.03 1.95 2.16 0.42 0.49 2003
2004 66.84 43.03 26.90 16.65 5.54 3.53 1.30 0.85 0.32 23.81 16.13 10.25 11.11 2.00 2.23 0.45 0.53 2004
2005 66.37 42.76 26.77 16.61 5.57 3.55 1.27 0.82 0.30 23.61 15.99 10.17 11.04 2.02 2.28 0.45 0.52 2005
Notes: Computations by authors based on wage income tax statistics in the Surveys on Private Wages and Salaries ; see Appendix for details.
Wage income is defined as the sum of wages, salaries, bonuses, allowances, and taxable fringe benefits, excluding retirement benefits and non-taxable benefits.
Top wage income groups are defined relative to regular employees in the private sector in Japan.Table 3: Standard Exemptions and Tax Reductions in National Income Tax, 1951-2005
Basic  Dependent Spouse Employment Number of Brackets Proportional
     Year Exemption Exemption Exemp ion Income and the Range Tax
(per tax unit) (per  (per spouse) Deduc ion of Tax Rates Reduction
dependent)
1950 25 12 12 15% of income deduction, maximum 30 8 brackets, 20-55% none
1951 38 17 17 15% , max 30 11 brackets, 20-55% none
1952 50 20 20 15% , max 30 8 brackets, 20-55% none
1953 60 35* 35 15% , max 45 11 brackets, 15-65% none
1954 68 38 8* 39 15% , max 45 11 brackets, 15-65% none
1955 75 40* 40 15% , max 52.5 11 brackets, 15-65% none
1956 80 40* 40 17% , max 70 11 brackets, 15-65% none
1957 88 47 5* 48 20-7 5%  depending on income, max 110 13 brackets, 10-70% none
1958 90 50* 50 20-10% ,  max 120 13 brackets, 10-70% none
1959 90 65* 65 20-10% ,  max 120 13 brackets, 10-70% none
1960 90 70* 70 20-10% ,  max 120 13 brackets, 10-70% none
1961 90 50** 90 20-10% ,  max 120 13 brackets, 10-70% none
1962 97.5 50** 97.5 20-10% ,  max 120 15 brackets, 8-75% none
1963 107.5 50** 103.75 20-10% ,  max 120 15 brackets, 8-75% none
1964 117.5 50** 108.8 20-7 5% , max 135 15 brackets, 8-75% none
1965 127.5 57 5** 117.5 20-7 5% , max 147 5 15 brackets, 8-75% none
1966 137.5 60** 127.5 20-7 5% , max 172 5 15 brackets, 8.5-75% none
1967 147.5 67 5 145 20-10% , max 210 15 brackets, 9-75% none
1968 157.5 77 5 157.5 20-7 5% , max 265 15 brackets, 9.5-75% none
1969 167.5 95 167.5 20- 2% , max 348 16 brackets, 10-75% none
1970 177.5 115 177.5 20- 4% , max 468 19 brackets, 10-75% none
1971 195 135 195 20-5% , max 522.5 19 brackets, 10-75% none
1972 200 140 200 20-5% , max 530 19 brackets, 10-75% none
1973 207.5 155 207.5 20- 4% , max 710 19 brackets, 10-75% none
1974 232.5 220 232.5 35% -7%, minimum guarantee 437 5 19 brackets, 10-75% none
1975 260 260 260 40-10% , min guarantee 500 19 brackets, 10-75% none
1976 260 260 260 40-10% , min guarantee 500 19 brackets, 10-75% none
1977 290 290 290 40-10% , min guarantee 500 19 brackets, 10-75% none
1978 290 290 290 40-10% , min guarantee 500 19 brackets, 10-75% none
1979 290 290 290 40-10% , min guarantee 500 19 brackets, 10-75% none
1980 290 290 290 40-10% , min guarantee 500 19 brackets, 10-75% none
1981 290 290 290 40-10% , min guarantee 500 19 brackets, 10-75% none
1982 290 290 290 40-10% , min guarantee 500 19 brackets, 10-75% none
1983 290 290 290 40-10% , min guarantee 500 19 brackets, 10-75% none
1984 330 330 330 40-5% , min guarantee 570 15 brackets, 10.5-70% none
1985 330 330 330 40-5% , min guarantee 570 15 brackets, 10.5-70% none
1986 330 330 330 40-5% , min guarantee 570 15 brackets, 10.5-70% none
1987 330 330 330*** 40-5% , min guarantee 570 12 brackets, 10.5-60% none
1988 330 330 330*** 40-5% , min guarantee 570 5 brackets, 10-60% none
1989 350 350 350*** 40-5% , min guarantee 650 5 brackets, 10-50% none
1990 350 350 350*** 40-5% , min guarantee 650 5 brackets, 10-50% none
1991 350 350 350*** 40-5% , min guarantee 650 5 brackets, 10-50% none
1992 350 350 350*** 40-5% , min guarantee 650 5 brackets, 10-50% none
1993 350 350** 350*** 40-5% , min guarantee 650 5 brackets, 10-50% none
1994 350 350** 350*** 40-5% , min guarantee 650 5 brackets, 10-50% 20% of tax reduction, max 2,000
1995 380 380** 380*** 40-5% , min guarantee 650 5 brackets, 10-50% 15% of tax reduction, max 50
1996 380 380** 380*** 40-5% , min guarantee 650 5 brackets, 10-50% 15% of tax reduction, max 50
1997 380 380** 380*** 40-5% , min guarantee 650 5 brackets, 10-50% none
1998 380 380** 380*** 40-5% , min guarantee 650 5 brackets, 10-50% 95 of lump-sum tax reduction
1999 380 480** 380*** 40-5% , min guarantee 650 4 brackets, 10-37% 20% of tax reduction, max 250
2000 380 480** 380*** 40-5% , min guarantee 650 4 brackets, 10-37% 20% of tax reduction, max 250
2001 380 380** 380*** 40-5% , min guarantee 650 4 brackets, 10-37% 20% of tax reduction, max 250
2002 380 380** 380*** 40-5% , min guarantee 650 4 brackets, 10-37% 20% of tax reduction, max 250
2003 380 380** 380*** 40-5% , min guarantee 650 4 brackets, 10-37% 20% of tax reduction, max 250
2004 380 380** 380 40-5% , min guarantee 650 4 brackets, 10-37% 20% of tax reduction, max 250
2005 380 380** 380 40-5% , min guarantee 650 4 brackets, 10-37% 20% of tax reduction, max 250
Sources: Japan National Tax Administration (1988), pp.154-207; OECD (1988-96), Tax/Benefit Position of Production Workers;
Ishi (2001), Tables 17.8 and 17.9; OECD (1997-98), Tax/Benefit Position of Employees;  OECD (1999-2007), Taxing Wages.
Notes:
All amounts are expressed in nominal 1,000 yen.
* The amount of dependent exemption is different for the second child.
** The amount of dependent exemption varies depending on the age of a child.
*** Additional special spouse exemption is allowed for a non-working spouse.























1951 30.89 39.00 44.81 49.53 55.63 57.59 62.13 63.21 63.90 64.90 1951
1952 30.36 38.26 43.47 47.89 56.12 58.89 61.98 63.21 64.90 64.90 1952
1953 22.16 30.60 38.72 43.15 51.47 54.27 58.30 60.30 66.00 71.50 1953
1954 22.64 31.27 39.54 44.18 52.71 55.52 59.73 61.82 67.50 73.13 1954
1955 23.36 32.22 41.33 46.92 54.33 57.52 63.65 65.84 72.00 78.00 1955
1956 24.96 34.12 42.59 47.20 54.79 58.37 65.72 69.21 75.31 78.33 1956
1957 17.16 23.05 28.30 32.08 40.21 43.97 51.74 55.44 67.90 83.20 1957
1958 17.20 23.10 28.40 32.31 40.64 44.70 54.08 58.63 71.53 84.45 1958
1959 16.23 21.83 27.85 32.76 41.40 45.16 54.35 59.03 72.20 85.60 1959
1960 18.51 25.20 31.36 35.10 43.77 47.78 56.69 61.09 72.40 85.60 1960
1961 20.66 26.23 30.13 34.33 44.19 47.91 56.96 61.24 72.40 85.60 1961
1962 19.25 24.00 28.87 33.97 45.39 50.19 58.16 62.02 76.00 93.00 1962
1963 19.86 25.09 29.29 33.76 45.89 51.14 60.31 65.05 78.50 93.00 1963
1964 20.80 26.63 31.69 37.22 47.61 51.64 62.06 66.45 78.50 93.00 1964
1965 20.52 26.45 31.54 37.07 47.55 51.68 62.19 66.61 78.50 93.00 1965
1966 19.00 24.10 29.24 35.01 46.50 51.49 61.83 66.40 78.50 93.00 1966
1967 20.94 26.66 31.50 37.17 48.26 52.37 62.25 66.58 78.50 93.00 1967
1968 22.52 28.96 34.67 40.18 51.53 56.11 63.47 66.90 79.00 93.00 1968
1969 21.34 27.05 31.97 36.88 48.09 53.36 63.67 67.59 79.00 93.00 1969
1970 20.68 26.02 30.35 35.36 46.95 52.86 65.15 70.01 81.50 93.00 1970
1971 20.42 25.41 29.50 33.78 44.16 50.45 64.61 70.27 81.50 93.00 1971
1972 24.44 28.04 32.17 36.82 48.14 54.17 65.11 69.90 81.50 93.00 1972
1973 25.86 30.28 34.96 39.85 51.53 57.35 66.26 70.20 81.50 93.00 1973
1974 25.08 28.02 31.11 34.68 43.06 47.84 59.26 65.16 79.00 93.00 1974
1975 25.51 28.45 31.52 35.07 44.47 50.24 61.68 66.28 79.00 93.00 1975
1976 26.40 29.87 33.22 37.21 46.89 52.04 63.56 68.03 79.50 93.00 1976
1977 27.25 30.35 33.98 38.23 49.04 54.61 64.51 68.30 79.50 93.00 1977
1978 28.57 32.18 36.03 40.32 50.06 55.11 65.91 70.73 82.00 93.00 1978
1979 29.75 33.43 37.41 42.53 53.84 59.02 69.07 72.96 82.50 93.00 1979
1980 30.85 34.59 39.01 43.88 54.89 60.32 71.44 76.13 85.00 93.00 1980
1981 31.38 35.40 39.72 44.31 56.24 61.33 71.00 75.80 85.00 93.00 1981
1982 31.47 35.61 40.12 44.99 57.50 63.06 71.89 75.88 85.00 93.00 1982
1983 32.62 36.83 41.52 46.91 58.19 62.92 71.80 75.80 85.00 93.00 1983
1984 31.44 35.47 40.20 45.06 56.54 62.45 73.41 76.78 82.50 88.00 1984
1985 33.95 38.87 44.23 49.16 59.82 64.60 73.55 76.73 82.50 88.00 1985
1986 34.90 39.45 44.18 49.08 59.70 64.57 73.60 76.77 82.50 88.00 1986
1987 33.30 37.70 41.83 47.17 58.87 63.18 69.02 70.93 75.00 78.00 1987
1988 33.80 39.25 44.38 49.42 60.71 64.66 68.46 70.06 73.50 76.00 1988
1989 31.15 37.49 43.67 49.23 58.90 61.58 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 1989
1990 31.19 37.53 43.70 49.26 58.91 61.58 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 1990
1991 31.23 37.54 43.70 49.23 58.95 61.58 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 1991
1992 32.87 40.10 47.77 52.71 58.97 61.60 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 1992
1993 31.18 37.51 43.65 49.20 58.92 61.56 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 1993
1994 29.09 34.24 39.33 44.12 51.09 54.32 62.93 65.00 65.00 65.00 1994
1995 30.34 37.86 46.62 52.73 58.95 61.56 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 1995
1996 27.17 32.93 38.72 42.97 49.77 52.90 59.13 61.65 65.00 65.00 1996
1997 28.53 33.43 38.75 42.96 49.78 52.91 59.10 61.64 65.00 65.00 1997
1998 31.72 35.55 39.02 43.30 50.61 54.16 63.04 65.00 65.00 65.00 1998
1999 25.01 29.48 34.29 38.91 45.86 47.66 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 1999
2000 25.04 29.52 34.34 38.97 45.90 47.68 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 2000
2001 25.05 29.55 34.38 39.02 45.92 47.69 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 2001
2002 24.68 29.33 34.40 39.02 45.92 47.69 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 2002
2003 24.77 29.41 34.48 39.09 45.99 47.74 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 2003
2004 24.89 29.54 34.59 39.19 46.06 47.79 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 2004
2005 25.28 29.79 34.62 39.21 46.03 47.76 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 2005
Notes: The table reports the (income-weighted) average marginal tax rates for top wage income groups for an individual with a non-
working spouse and two dependent children, assuming that all income is employment income. Marginal tax rates include national and local
(prefectural and municipal) income taxes, but excludes social security contr butions, corporate income tax, and non-income taxes.
Standard deductions (basic, spouse, dependent, and employment income deductions) and tax reductions are taken into account,







Number of Wage 
Earners
Average Wage 
Income in Each  
Group 
(in 2005 yen) (in 2005 yen)
Full Population 46,310,000 4,316,000
Top 40% 4,254,000 Top 40-20% 9,262,000 5,126,000
Top 20% 6,037,000 Top 20-10% 4,631,000 6,940,000
Top 10%  7,882,000 Top 10-5% 2,315,500 8,830,000
Top 5% 9,781,000 Top 5-1% 1,852,400 11,983,000
Top 1% 15,754,000 Top 1-0.5% 231,550 17,522,000
Top 0.5% 19,413,000 Top 0.5-0.1% 185,240 24,701,000
Top 0.1% 34,316,000 Top 0.1-0.05% 43,995 39,033,000
Top 0.05% 44,393,000 Top 0.05-0.01% 18,524 56,865,000
Top 0.01% 80,714,000 Top 0.01% 4,631 129,978,000
Notes: Computations are based on wage income tax statistics.
Wage income is the sum of wages and salaries, bonuses, allowances, and taxable benefits, but excludes retirement income.
Top groups are defined relative to regular employees in the private sector in Japan.  "Top 20-10%" refers to the bottom 10% of 
he top 40%  income group, and "top 20-10%" refers to the bottom 10% of  he top 20% income group, and so on.
Total wage income denominator is estimated based on the National Accounts.
Amounts are expressed in 2005 yen.




Threshold                
in the U.S. 
Wage Income 
Threshold             in 
Japan 
Wage Income     
Group
Average Wage 
Income in the U.S.
Average Wage 
Income in Japan
(in 2004 dollar) (in 2005 dollar) (in 2004 dollar) (in 2005 dollar)
Full Population 39,176 39,236
Top 40% 33,042 38,673 Top 40-20% 41,869 46,600
Top 20% 53,173 54,882 Top 20-10% 63,114 63,091
Top 10%  76,211 71,655 Top 10-5% 85,304 80,273
Top 5% 98,681 88,918 Top 5-1% 134,639 108,936
Top 1% 219,153 143,218 Top 1-0.5% 260,240 159,291
Top 0.5% 319,402 176,482 Top 0.5-0.1% 456,234 224,555
Top 0.1% 771,353 311,964 Top 0.1% 1,914,153 502,373
Source: U.S., Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2007), Table 1. Japan, see above.
Notes: U.S. estimates are for 2004. Japanese estimates are for 2005 and expressed in 2005 U.S. dollar using the exchange rate of $1=110 yen.
The U.S. data cover commerce and industry employees, excluding government, farm, domestic, and self-employed workers.Table 6: No. of Employees and Directors by Firm Size in Japan, 1960-2005
All Corporations "Medium" Corporations "Large" Corporations "Very Large" Corporations
Capital 10 million to 100 million yen Capital 100 million to 1 billion yen Capital over 1 billion yen






per Firm No. of Firms




























1960 497,206       28.6 2.9 11,141 2.2% 169.7 6.7 1,726 0.35% 830.1 9.8 415 0.08% 5,450.9 14.9 1960
1961 437,266       32.1 2.7 10,911 2.5% 170.6 6.4 2,190 0.50% 737 5 10.1 537 0.12% 4,996.7 14.7 1961
1962 450,784       32.2 2.5 13,145 2.9% 164.7 5.7 2,599 0.58% 676.6 9.1 638 0.14% 4,655.1 14.5 1962
1963 464,519       30.8 2.7 15,235 3.3% 142.4 6.0 2,999 0.65% 628 8 9.3 713 0.15% 4,431.1 14.6 1963
1964 479,973       32.0 2.9 19,667 4.1% 128.3 5.7 3,436 0.72% 579 2 9.3 804 0.17% 4,231.0 14.6 1964
1965 515,502       30.7 2.9 26,489 5.1% 122.1 5.5 3,631 0.70% 570.7 8.7 827 0.16% 4,160.6 14.8 1965
1966 558,016       30.0 2.6 33,274 6.0% 111.8 5.0 3,801 0.68% 537.1 8.5 900 0.16% 3,906.4 16.5 1966
1967 586,315       29.7 2.4 38,336 6.5% 104.9 4.8 4,369 0.75% 518 3 8.7 953 0.16% 3,877.4 14.4 1967
1968 780,797       26.5 2.6 47,429 6.1% 98.1 4.9 4,759 0.61% 506.7 8.6 1,018 0.13% 3,811.7 14.6 1968
1969 825,605       26.1 2.2 53,645 6.5% 90.0 4.0 5,671 0.69% 480.7 7.5 1,099 0.13% 3,732.9 13.8 1969
1970 874,692       25.3 2.2 61,955 7.1% 86.4 3.9 6,016 0.69% 462 9 7.3 1,185 0.14% 3,648.0 13.9 1970
1971 921,020       23.7 2.4 70,828 7.7% 75.5 4.1 6,593 0.72% 435 2 7.3 1,252 0.14% 3,531.8 14.0 1971
1972 960,230       23.7 2.4 80,699 8.4% 70.6 4.0 7,248 0.75% 404 9 7.1 1,375 0.14% 3,252.2 13.5 1972
1973 1,034,124    22.4 2.3 97,009 9.4% 62.6 3.8 7,889 0.76% 383.1 6.9 1,473 0.14% 3,167.0 13.7 1973
1974 1,108,107    21.8 2.3 113,833 10.3% 57.9 3.7 8,896 0.80% 355 9 6.7 1,576 0.14% 3,042.4 13.5 1974
1975 1,208,701    20.9 2.4 138,195 11.4% 53.8 3.9 9,852 0.82% 313 3 7.2 1,634 0.14% 2,889.5 14.0 1975
1976 1,292,536    19.4 2.5 158,856 12.3% 46.6 3.8 10,115 0.78% 299.6 7.1 1,704 0.13% 2,754.6 14.6 1976
1977 1,351,042    18.4 2.4 176,441 13.1% 42.7 3.6 10,351 0.77% 282 2 7.1 1,793 0.13% 2,594.5 13.7 1977
1978 1,426,441    19.0 2.4 196,759 13.8% 44.7 3.6 10,585 0.74% 280 3 6.8 1,851 0.13% 2,470.5 13.5 1978
1979 1,510,275    18.1 2.5 217,458 14.4% 42.0 3.6 11,030 0.73% 274.7 6.8 1,913 0.13% 2,380.8 13.5 1979
1980 1,567,764    17.8 2.5 236,927 15.1% 40.2 3.6 13,045 0.83% 250.4 6.5 2,020 0.13% 2,296.5 13.4 1980
1981 1,714,885    17.1 2.4 264,273 15.4% 38.2 3.4 13,415 0.78% 250.1 6.5 2,088 0.12% 2,263.4 13.7 1981
1982 1,748,967    17.0 2.4 279,223 16.0% 38.6 3.4 13,876 0.79% 244.6 6.4 2,195 0.13% 2,219.1 13.5 1982
1983 1,795,050    16.2 2.5 294,153 16.4% 35.3 3.5 14,222 0.79% 236 3 6.4 2,298 0.13% 2,159.0 13.8 1983
1984 1,819,109    16.9 2.4 306,080 16.8% 36.8 3.4 14,680 0.81% 232 2 6.3 2,458 0.14% 2,064.3 13.7 1984
1985 1,830,568    17.2 2.4 316,833 17.3% 37.6 3.4 15,119 0.83% 226 0 6.4 2,598 0.14% 2,138.5 13.7 1985
1986 1,874,121    17.0 2.3 333,419 17.8% 36.8 3.3 15,675 0.84% 217 9 6.0 2,691 0.14% 2,095.1 13.7 1986
1987 1,929,759    17.1 2.4 353,101 18.3% 37.3 3.3 16,733 0.87% 211.4 5.9 2,846 0.15% 1,986.3 13.5 1987
1988 1,980,540    17.4 2.4 376,205 19.0% 36.4 3.3 17,442 0.88% 212 0 5.8 3,088 0.16% 1,940.0 13.4 1988
1989 1,937,322    17.7 2.4 377,751 19.5% 36.3 3.3 18,916 0.98% 201 5 5.8 3,414 0.18% 1,844.7 13.3 1989
1990 2,020,455    17.1 2.4 406,618 20.1% 33.4 3.2 19,997 0.99% 196.7 5.7 3,805 0.19% 1,752.0 13.2 1990
1991 2,106,584    17.9 2.4 439,047 20.8% 33.7 3.3 21,474 1.02% 194 0 5.7 4,065 0.19% 1,722.7 13.4 1991
1992 2,237,566    16.7 2.4 485,684 21.7% 31.9 3.2 22,718 1.02% 194 8 5.5 4,245 0.19% 1,701.1 13.3 1992
1993 2,335,355    16.3 2.4 551,083 23.6% 29.8 3.1 23,494 1.01% 192 0 5.4 4,485 0.19% 1,634.0 13.0 1993
1994 2,407,278    16.0 2.4 617,706 25.7% 28.1 3.1 23,734 0.99% 187 5 5.4 4,718 0.20% 1,549.1 12.9 1994
1995 2,449,248    15.5 2.3 681,600 27.8% 26.2 3.0 23,994 0.98% 182 8 5.3 4,897 0.20% 1,478.6 12.7 1995
1996 2,467,846    14.9 2.3 809,590 32.8% 21.7 2.8 24,317 0.99% 182.1 5.2 5,114 0.21% 1,422.1 12.5 1996
1997 2,433,951    15.4 2.3 1,080,091 44.4% 18.4 2.7 24,883 1.02% 180.4 5.2 5,237 0.22% 1,389.0 12.4 1997
1998 2,470,470    15.4 2.3 1,134,857 45.9% 18.0 2.6 25,726 1.04% 180.7 5.1 5,310 0.21% 1,365.3 12.0 1998
1999 2,509,912    15.4 2.3 1,149,791 45.8% 17.8 2.6 26,089 1.04% 186 0 4.9 5,386 0.21% 1,324.6 11.3 1999
2000 2,548,399    15.4 2.3 1,156,152 45.4% 18.6 2.7 26,414 1.04% 171.7 4.8 5,472 0.21% 1,263.3 10.8 2000
2001 2,607,923    14.2 2.3 1,175,140 45.1% 16.7 2.6 27,301 1.05% 166 0 4.6 5,559 0.21% 1,225.1 10.4 2001
2002 2,626,954    13.8 2.2 1,173,103 44.7% 16.2 2.6 27,960 1.06% 165.1 4.6 5,671 0.22% 1,208.0 9.9 2002
2003 2,638,798    13.9 2.2 1,142,236 43.3% 16.5 2.6 28,220 1.07% 172 5 4.4 5,686 0.22% 1,187.0 9.5 2003
2004 2,701,573    14.6 2.3 1,149,142 42.5% 17.8 2.7 28,213 1.04% 189.4 4.8 5,620 0.21% 1,205.7 9.9 2004
2005 2,718,777    15.3 2.3 1,144,365 42.1% 19.4 2.7 27,645 1.02% 204.1 4.6 5,616 0.21% 1,200.7 9.8 2005
Source: Ministry of Finance, Corporations Financial Statement Statistics.Table 7: Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
Variable Definition No. of 
Observations Mean Median Max Min Standard 
Deviations Source
WIS 0.01 Top 0.01% wage income share (expressed in %) 55 0.20 0.19 0.32 0.13 0.04 Table 2
WIS 0.1-0.01 Top 0.1-0.01% wage income share 55 0.81 0.76 1.08 0.61 0.14 Table 2
WIS 0.5-0.1 Top 0.5-0.1% wage income share 55 2.11 2.01 2.89 1.79 0.27 Table 2
WIS 1-0.5 Top 1-0.5% wage income share 55 1.96 1.92 2.35 1.73 0.17 Table 2
WIS 5-1 Top 5-1% wage income share 55 10.61 10.68 11.34 9.74 0.42 Table 2
WIS 10-5 Top 10-5% wage income share 55 9.52 9.47 10.25 8.50 0.48 Table 2
WIS 20-10 Top 20-10% wage income share 55 14.76 14.94 16.21 12.51 1.10 Table 2
WIS 40-20 Top 40-20% wage income share 55 21.16 22.70 24.13 14.59 3.08 Table 2
NOTR 0.01 Net-of-tax rate, defined by 100 - Marginal Tax Rate, for top 
0.01% wage income group (expressed in %)
55 28.44 26.50 50.00 15.00 10.71 See Appendix and Table 4
NOTR 0.1-0.01 Net-of-tax rate for top 0.1-0.01% group 55 39.53 40.00 50.95 28.50 6.57 See Appendix and Table 4
NOTR 0.5-0.1 Net-of-tax rate for top 0.5-0.1% group 55 48.75 50.00 60.09 37.00 6.30 See Appendix and Table 4
NOTR 1-0.5 Net-of-tax rate for top 1-0.5% group 55 55.35 56.50 66.18 45.00 6.45 See Appendix and Table 4
NOTR 5-1 Net-of-tax rate for top 5-1% group 55 63.01 64.23 73.00 50.00 6.25 See Appendix and Table 4
NOTR 10-5 Net-of-tax rate for top 10-5% group 55 71.22 72.50 81.20 60.00 5.62 See Appendix and Table 4
NOTR 20-10 Net-of-tax rate for top 20-10% group 55 77.57 77.50 90.00 68.00 5.67 See Appendix and Table 4
NOTR 40-20 Net-of-tax rate for top 40-20% group 55 84.53 82.90 99.00 73.00 7.77 See Appendix and Table 4
ROS Returns on sales, defined by Operational Profits/ Sales, for all 
corporations (expressed in %)
52 3.88 3.59 6.03 2.14 1.15 Corporations Financial Statement Statistics 
by Ministry of Finance
FLP Female labor participation rate, defined by Female Labor Force/ 
Female Population age 15 and above (expressed in %)
53 50.22 49.90 56.70 45.70 2.76 Labour Force Survey by Ministry of Health, 
Labour and Welfare
DISP Dispute rate, defined by Workers Involved in Disputes with 
Dispute Acts / Total Employment (expressed in %)
55 5.43 5.82 14.49 0.05 4.45 Labour Dispute Statistics by Ministry of 
Health, Labour and Welfare
UNION Unionization rate, defined by Union Members/ Total Employemnt 
(expressed in %)
55 29.96 32.10 42.57 18.70 5.78 Trade Union Basic Survey by Ministry of 
Health, Labour and Welfare
INFL Inflation rate, defined by CPI(t)-CPI(t-1)/ CPI(t-1), expressed in % 55 3.87 3.10 24.44 -1.52 4.71 Japan Statistical Yearbook by Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and CommerceTable 8-a: Elasticities of Wage Income Shares with respect to Net-of-Tax Rates in Japan
Dependent Variable
OLS with       
robust std. err.       
(no time controls)
OLS with                 
N-W std. err.            
(no time controls)
OLS with               
N-W std. err.           
(linear time 
controls)
OLS with                    
N-W std. err.         
(quadratic time 
controls)
2SLS with IV                
(quadratic time 
controls)
Top 40%  share -0.45 (0.10)*** -0.45 (0.13)*** 0.07 (0.10) 0.17 (0.05)*** 0.11 (0.07)
Top 20%  share 0.01 (0.07) 0.01 (0.12) 0.20 (0.08)** 0.19 (0.09)** -0.03 (0.08)
Top 10%  share 0.16 (0.06)** 0.16 (0.12) 0.20 (0.10)** 0.21 (0.12)* 0.00 (0.08)
Top 5%  share 0.26 (0.07)*** 0.26 (0.14)* 0.23 (0.13)* 0.24 (0.14)* 0.07 (0.10)
Top 1%  share 0.51 (0.10)*** 0.51 (0.19)*** 0.43 (0.17)** 0.33 (0.19)* 0.29 (0.15)**
Top 0.5%  share 0.61 (0.09)*** 0.61 (0.17)*** 0.56 (0.14)*** 0.39 (0.20)* 0.45 (0.17)**
Top 0.1%  share 0.65 (0.08)*** 0.65 (0.13)*** 0.67 (0.11)*** 0.45 (0.25)* 1.16 (0.38)**
Top 0.01%  share 0.30 (0.06)*** 0.30 (0.10)*** 0.40 (0.11)*** -0.04 (0.13) -0.57 (0.24)**
Notes:
Dependent variable is log (top wage income share) for t=1951-2005.
Independent variables are a constant and log (net-of-tax rate) with or without time trends.
For the OLS regression in the first column and 2SLS regression, robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses.
For the other OLS regressions, Newey-West standard errors with 8 lags are reported in the parentheses.
For the 2SLS regression, log (net-of-tax rate) is instrumented with log (100 - highest statutory MTR).
***= significant at 1%, **= significant at 5%, *= significant at 10%.
Table 8-b: Comparing Elasticity Estimates in the U.S. and Japan
Dependent Variable U.S. Japan
Top 10%  share 0.10 0.20**
Top 5%  share 0.17* 0.23*
Top 1%  share 0.39*** 0.43**
Top 0.5%  share 0.51*** 0.56***
Top 0.1%  share 0.82*** 0.67***
Top 0.01%  share 0.96** 0.40***
Source: U.S., Saez (2004), Table 5, column (2). Japan, Table 8-a above, third column.
Notes: U.S. estimates are for 1960-2000, OLS regression with quadratic time controls and Newey-West standard errors.
***= significant at 1%, **= significant at 5%, *= significant at 10%.Table 9: Determinants of Top 0.1%  Wage Income Share in Japan: Various Specifications
Dependent Variable: Log of Top 0.1% Wage Income Share
Independent Variables
OLS Regression    
(1)
OLS Regression    
(2)
OLS Regression    
(3)
OLS Regression    
(4)
OLS Regression    
(5)
OLS Regression    
(6)
OLS Regression    
(7)
OLS Regression    
(8)








Log (Net-of-Tax Rate) 0 645 (0.130)*** 0.496 (0.141)*** 0.339 (0.097)*** 0.384 (0.100)*** 0.669 (0.109)*** 0.429 (0.112)*** 0 278 (0.085)*** 0.316 (0.088)*** 0.448 (0.247)* 0.190 (0.194) 0.184 (0 201) 0.222 (0.199)
Log (ROS) 0.150 (0.067)** 0.339 (0.089)*** 0.351 (0 088)*** 0.297 (0.121)** 0 265 (0.093)*** 0.279 (0.094)*** 0.323 (0 086)*** 0.287 (0 075)*** 0.301 (0.079)***
Log (FLP) 1.480 (0.584)** 1.391 (0.329)*** 1.089 (0 358)*** 1.732 (0.486)*** 0.709 (0.471) 0.531 (0.492) 0.841 (0 612) 0.471 (0 529) 0.289 (0.498)
Log (DISP) -0.044 (0.019)** -0.032 (0 021) -0.103 (0.034)*** -0.009 (0.036)** -0.077 (0.043)* -0 064 (0.046)
INFL (in %) -0.006 (0 003)** -0.004 (0.003) -0 004 (0.003)
Linear Time Controls -0.004 (0.001)*** 0.004 (0.003) -0 009 (0.005)* -0.008 (0.005)* -0.018 (0.014) -0.019 (0 017) -0.018 (0.017) -0 018 (0.016)
Quadratic Time Controls 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0 000) 0.000 (0 000) 0.000 (0.000)
D-W Statistics 0.28 0.51 0.69 0.78 0.41 0.63 0.72 0.77 0.32 0.54 0.64 0.70
Adjusted R Square 0.425 0.784 0.833 0.839 0.590 0.805 0.851 0.855 0.639 0.840 0.859 0.862
No. of Observations 55 52 52 52 55 52 52 52 55 52 52 52
Notes:
Dependent variable is log (top 0.1% wage income share) where t=1953-2005.
See Table 7 for the definitions of the variables.
Newey-West standard errors with 8 lags are reported in the parentheses.
***= significant at 1%, **= significant at 5%, *= significant at 10%.
Panel A Panel C Panel BTable 10-a: Determinants of Wage Income Shares in Japan: Multivariate Regressions (1)
Wage Income Group Log (NOTR) Log (ROS) Log (FLP) Linear Time Trend Adjusted R Square
Top 40-20%  -0.404 (0.140)*** 0.089 (0.057) -1.070 (0.221)*** 0.006 (0.001)*** 0.944
Top 20-10%  -0.168 (0.048)*** 0.041 (0.022)* -0.100 (0.097) 0.004 (0.000)*** 0.935
Top 10-5%  0.045 (0.063) 0.035 (0.017)** 0.277 (0.104)*** 0.004 (0.000)*** 0.805
Top 5-1%  0.130 (0.072)* 0.096 (0.015)*** 0.579 (0.092)*** 0.003 (0.001)*** 0.652
Top 1-0.5%  0.213 (0.058)*** 0.187 (0.026)*** 1.028 (0.118)*** 0.003 (0.001)*** 0.778
Top 0.5-0.1%  0.356 (0.054)*** 0.215 (0.053)*** 1.429 (0.214)*** 0.003 (0.001)** 0.834
Top 0.1-0.01%  0.434 (0.086)*** 0.272 (0.098)*** 1.749 (0.376)*** 0.003 (0.003) 0.847
Top 0.01%  0.224 (0.153) 0.457 (0.204)** 2.004 (1.015)** 0.007 (0.006) 0.640
Table 10-b: Determinants of Wage Income Shares in Japan: Multivariate Regressions (2)
Wage Income Group Log (NOTR) Log (ROS) Log (FLP) Log (DISP) Linear Time Trend Adjusted R Square
Top 40-20%  -0.213 (0.126)* 0.091 (0.052)* -0.836 (0.237)*** 0.034 (0.017)** 0.011 (0.002)*** 0.952
Top 20-10%  -0.080 (0.074) 0.045 (0.020)** 0.085 (0.094) 0.019 (0.011)* 0.007 (0.001)*** 0.946
Top 10-5%  0.071 (0.069) 0.037 (0.015)** 0.383 (0.195)** 0.008 (0.015) 0.005 (0.002)*** 0.809
Top 5-1%  0.134 (0.086) 0.097 (0.016)*** 0.607 (0.142)*** 0.002 (0.012) 0.004 (0.002)** 0.653
Top 1-0.5%  0.164 (0.083)** 0.168 (0.035) *** 0.593 (0.195)*** -0.033 (0.017)* -0.002 (0.003) 0.802
Top 0.5-0.1%  0.281 (0.068)***  0.186 (0.048)*** 0.785 (0.234)*** -0.052 (0.018)*** -0.004 (0.003) 0.862
Top 0.1-0.01%  0.313 (0.066)*** 0.244 (0.078)*** 0.851 (0.380)** -0.084 (0.029)*** -0.007 (0.004)* 0.881
Top 0.01%  -0.007 (0.092) 0.389 (0.124)*** 0.727 (0.937) -0.200 (0.050)*** -0.013 (0.007)* 0.754
Table 10-c: Determinants of Wage Income Shares in Japan: Multivariate Regressions (3)
Wage Income Group Log (NOTR) Log (ROS) Log (FLP) Log (DISP) INFL Linear Time Trend Adjusted R 
Square
Top 40-20%  -0.217 (0.159) 0.090 (0.056) -0.827 (0.285)*** 0.034 (0.019)* 0.000 (0.002) 0.011 (0.002)*** 0.952
Top 20-10%  -0.100 (0.083) 0.040 (0.020)** 0.141 (0.101) 0.016 (0.012) 0.001 (0.001) 0.007 (0.002)*** 0.948
Top 10-5%  0.057 (0.083) 0.030 (0.014)** 0.464 (0.187)** 0.004 (0.016) 0.002 (0.001)* 0.005 (0.002)** 0.822
Top 5-1%  0.122 (0.094) 0.089 (0.019)*** 0.681 (0.161)*** -0.001 (0.013) 0.002 (0.001) 0.003 (0.002)* 0.669
Top 1-0.5%  0.154 (0.091)* 0.162 (0.041)*** 0.651 (0.196)*** -0.036 (0.020)* 0.001 (0.002) -0.002 (0.003) 0.804
Top 0.5-0.1%  0.283 (0.070)*** 0.187 (0.049)*** 0.776 (0.237)*** -0.052 (0.022)** -0.000 (0.002) -0.004 (0.003) 0.862
Top 0.1-0.01%  0.354 (0.062)*** 0.260 (0.077)*** 0.660 (0.380)* -0.070 (0.031)** -0.005 (0.002)** -0.006 (0.004) 0.886
Top 0.01%  -0.041 (0.119) 0.374 (0.128)*** 1.012 (1.167) -0.214 (0.048)*** 0.004 (0.005) -0.014 (0.007)* 0.756
Notes:
Dependent variable is log (top wage income share) for each top wage income group where t=1953-2005. 
Log (NOTR) is defined by log (100-MTR). See Table 7 for the definitions of other variables.
Newey-West standard errors with 8 lags are reported in the parentheses.
***= significant at 1%, **= significant at 5%, *= significant at 10%.Source: Japan, Moriguchi and Saez (2007), Table C2; U.S., Piketty and Saez (2003), Table IV, updated to 2005.














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Top 1-0.5% ShareSources: Ministry of Finance (1960-2005), Corporations Financial Statement Statistics.
Notes: "Medium corporations" are defined as firms with capital between 10 million and 100 million yen. "Large corporations" are defined as firms with capital between 100 million and 1 billion yen.
"Very large corporations" are defined as firms with capital over 1 billion yen. "Derectors" include derectors who are also employees, and "employees" exclude those employees who are also directors.
"Director bonus" is bonus paid out of net profits at the end of fiscal year.
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MTR for Top 0.1%
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MTR for Top 1%
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MTR for Top 10%
Top 10% ShareNotes:
For each wage income group, the coefficients in Table 10-b are used to compute fitted values.
Independent variables are log (NOTR), log (ROS), log (FLP), and log (DISP) with linear time controls.




























































































































































































































































































































































For each wage income group, the coefficients in Table 10-b are used to compute fitted values.
Independent variables are log (NOTR), log (ROS), log (FLP), and log (DISP) with linear time controls.




































































































































































































































































Figure 8-e: Top 1-0.5% Wage Income Share
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